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Abstract 
 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT) is a regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) comprised of over 
fifty cooperating states and fishing entities.  It manages Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna 
(Thunnus thynnus) in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.  Due to overfishing 
and ineffective management, the stock abundance of this species has declined to about 
thirty percent of its unfished biomass in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.  
Publications point to this poor stock status as evidence of a fisheries management 
failure; it is commonly repeated that ICCAT’s mismanagement of the resource 
amounts to an international disgrace.  To maintain bluefin tuna stocks at a level that 
can support maximum sustainable yield (MSY), ICCAT has implemented unique tools 
to manage this important fishery, which include Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits, 
tuna ranching control measures, catch documentation, and others that are not 
employed in other ICCAT fisheries. 
 In this thesis research, I examine the factors that contribute to the tools utilized 
to manage the fishery in the ICCAT Convention Area to shed light on why they are 
managed differently than other ICCAT stocks. To do this, I conducted a literature 
review on publicly available ICCAT reports, governmental and non-governmental 
documents, peer reviewed scientific literature, and other sources to understand and 
explain the relevant importance of each contributing factor to the management of the 
species.  I utilized key informant interview methodology to obtain insights from 
twelve bluefin tuna experts representing a variety of interests that attend ICCAT 
	  	  
official meetings.  I transcribed and collected insights from semi-structured interviews, 
which I used to ground-truth the findings of the literature review. 
 No single factor is responsible for the unique management in place to govern 
ICCAT’s bluefin tuna fishery.  Rather, a nuanced interaction of many important 
factors contributes to the species’ poor stock status and unique management.  The 
history and complex nature of the fishery, unique biology of the species, strong 
demand in the world sushi market, impact of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing, and political will of ICCAT member countries to enforce 
Recommendations and Resolutions influence which measures are adopted and 
implemented.  This finding contrasts peer reviewed literature and other information to 
the contrary that attribute the unique management and poor stock status of bluefin tuna 
to such factors as high market value of the species’ meat, ineffective ICCAT 
management, Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons,” or the “free riding” of non-
cooperating fishing entities fully.   
 Based on key informant interviews, expert respondents share a high level of 
agreement that the special, “iconic” status that bluefin tuna have attained in popular 
media, scientific publications, and in general public opinion is an important factor that 
contributes to their management.  I argue that the powerful symbol that bluefin tuna 
has become in the policy realm affects its management in direct and indirect ways.  
This thesis research provides analyses of these various forces and the management 
context of the species, and shares recommendations for improving management of 
bluefin tuna and other ICCAT stocks.
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CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION 
     A.  Research Topic 
 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT) is the regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) tasked with the 
conservation and management of fisheries for highly migratory tuna and tuna-like 
species in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, including the Northern Atlantic 
bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus).  For the remainder of this thesis, I will use the term 
“bluefin tuna” to refer to Thunnus thynnus unless otherwise noted. Through an 
international agreement with nearly fifty member parties, ICCAT sets harvest policies 
to ensure the long-term sustainable yield, called Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) 
in fisheries literature, from stocks of the species under their management (ICCAT 
2011c).  For several decades, the stocks of this species have not been managed at 
MSY (ICCAT 2008).  In the following chapters, I provide evidence that bluefin tuna 
attract a majority of the management capacity and effort of ICCAT, and that this 
species is managed differently than other ICCAT stocks due to a variety of factors.  
The main focus of this thesis is finding out why this is the case. 
 
 B.  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 In this thesis, I explore ICCAT’s different management of bluefin tuna 
compared to other stocks through a two-part research question:  
 Why are bluefin tuna managed differently than other species under  ICCAT’s 
 purview?   
 
 What factors (such as stock status, market value, complex biology of the 
 species, nature of the fishery, and intense media attention, etc.) contribute to 
 this unique management?  
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 I rely on a literature review of publicly available information and key 
informant experiences to explore this question and to test six hypotheses that are 
grounded in conventional wisdom on bluefin tuna management: 
 1.  High market value of bluefin tuna meat does not fully account for the 
 unique  management of this species.  
 
 2.  Individual market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishing 
 industry are not greater in proportion to the management tools employed in this 
 fishery to other ICCAT-managed fisheries. 
 
 3.  Bluefin tuna have achieved an “iconic” or “charismatic” status in popular 
 media,  peer-reviewed literature, and in non-governmental group 
 publications that other ICCAT-managed stocks have not. 
 
 4.  This “iconic” status contributes to the management approaches adopted by 
 ICCAT to manage this species differently than others, and has important 
 implications for both the resource and the fishing industry. 
 
 5.  Non-scientific information and political pressure play a major role in 
 influencing which management tools are adopted at ICCAT meetings, and a 
 disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is afforded to 
 bluefin tuna. 
 
 6.  Media scrutiny and heightened status of bluefin tuna affects ICCAT’s 
 ability to effectively manage the species.  
  
 For this research, I define market value as the sum of the average market price 
paid per unit of weight over the MSY estimate provided by ICCAT’s scientific body, 
the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics.  An “iconic” species is one that 
embodies cultural or societal values, and often has for extended periods of time.  A 
“charismatic” species is similar to an “iconic” one but has physical attributes such as 
large size, great speed, perceived intelligence, or exceeding rarity that help humans 
identify with them moreso than with other organisms that do not share these traits. 
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 I test these hypotheses through a comparison of the findings of a literature 
review with responses of one dozen key informants that have an in-depth knowledge 
of ICCAT management. I provide evidence to support the idea that the current 
paradigms used to frame and understand the bluefin tuna management regime in the 
Atlantic Ocean, namely the “Tragedy of the Commons,” the high market value of the 
fish, and the failure of the weak international governance regime of ICCAT masks the 
complexity and true nature of the structure in place to manage bluefin tuna.   
 
     C. Common Explanations for Poor Stock Status of the Species 
 In published fisheries, economics, conservation biology, and political science 
literature, ICCAT’s management of bluefin tuna is pointed to as a failure, but authors 
cite a variety of causes (Fromentin and Fonteneau 2001, Magnuson et al. 2001, 
ICCAT 2008, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Aranda et al. 2010, Longo and Clausen 2011, 
Conathan 2012). I developed my hypotheses to test these ideas. Public media often 
cite Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” as the cause of the decline of the 
species, wherein Hardin argues that individuals acting in their own self-interest 
eventually cause the degradation of open-access resources (Hardin 1968, Nickler 
1999, McWhinnie 2006, The Economist 2008, Revkin 2008, Sumaila and Huang 
2012). Internet searches reveal articles with a similar thrust: 
 If EVER there were a graphic illustration of the tragedy of the commons, it  
 is the plummeting of the world's stocks of bluefin tuna (The Economist 2008). 
 
 I used this line of thinking to develop Hypotheses 1 and 2. I link Hypotheses 1 
and 2 with the “Tragedy of the Commons” common explanation found in the literature 
based on the fact that bluefin tuna is the most valuable individual fish in the world 
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(Porch 2005). Due to the very high value of the fish, it is commonly perceived that 
catching a single fish is like “winning the lottery.”  This seems to fuel the 
misperception that bluefin tuna fishers race to catch every last fish and that this drives 
the overexploitation of the resource (Ruais 2012).  This is simply untrue; the average 
bluefin tuna fisher never obtains the very high exvessel prices that are paid for 
outstanding specimens on Tsukiji Fish Market’s auction floors (Ruais 2012). 
 Others argue that the degraded bluefin fishery results from the sum of 
individual greed of fishers from each ICCAT nation, which drives the over 
exploitation of this valuable ICCAT fishery (Nickler 1999, Fromentin and Fonteneau 
2001, Fromentin and Powers 2005, Revkin 2008, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Greenberg 
2010). Conventional wisdom in literature confounds the high individual value of a 
bluefin tuna with high market value of the fishery as a whole (Magnuson et al. 2001, 
McWhinnie 2006, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Conathan 2012). It is a commonly-held 
belief that the high market value of the species drives its degradation by encouraging 
overfishing for individual gain and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
that drive a “Tragedy of the Commons” scenario (Magnuson et al. 2001, Fromentin 
and Powers 2005, MacKenzie et al. 2008). This led me to develop Hypothesis 2.  
 Next, some authors point to weaknesses in the regimes of RFMOs in general 
and lack of collective political will to effectively regulate resources as major drivers of 
the degradation of the world’s tuna fisheries (Aranda et al. 2010, Collette et al. 2011). 
Several sources attribute this lack of political will to effectively manage bluefin tuna 
to the prevalence of non-scientific information and elevated, “iconic” or “charismatic” 
status of the species, which led me to develop Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 6 to shed light 
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on the management of the species (Whynott 1995, Weber 2002, Fromentin and Ravier 
2005, Porch 2005, ICCAT 2008, Safina and Klinger 2008, ICIJ 2010, Ruais 2011).  
 
 D.  Research Context 
 Bluefin tuna are the largest, widest ranging, and most valuable of all bony 
fishes, and have been actively pursued by humans for millennia (Mather et al. 1995, 
See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) image.   
 
  
  
 
 
Photo from NMFS Photo Library: Web: <http://www.photolib.noaa.gov/bluefin>. 
Accessed 28 September 2012. 
 
 
 These facts are important to keep in mind when considering that ICCAT has 
consistently set harvest recommendations that are far above the best scientific 
evidence and the recommendations of their scientific experts, and that they have used 
different tools to manage this fishery (ICCAT 2008, Pew 2010, ICIJ 2010, NMFS 
2012a). As a result of overfishing, stocks of this species, or fish populations that have 
been divided up for management purposes, have steadily declined in the western and 
eastern Atlantic Ocean/Mediterranean Sea for decades (ICIJ 2010, Pew 2010, 
Boustany 2011, Collette et al. 2011, Sumaila and Huang 2012). ICCAT manages 
bluefin tuna more intensely and differently than any other species. The number, 
	  	  6	  
variety, and attributes of management tools ICCAT employs to regulate bluefin tuna 
make their governance unique among ICCAT stocks (See Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4).   
 
Table 1. ICCAT fishery management tools in the form of legally binding 
Recommendations and voluntary Resolutions, used for bluefin tuna since 1972.  Note:  
Bolded tools are unique to the bluefin fishery. 
BLUEFIN TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW 
Fishery Management Tool Year and 
Recommendation
/ Resolution 
Identification #  
Type of 
Tool 
Minimum Size Limit 1974-01 Output 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Percentage Shares 1981-01 Output 
Research Quota Set-Aside 1991-01 Input 
Bluefin Certification/Documentation 1993-05 Output 
Closed Season/Area for Longlining 1993-07 Input 
Spotter Plane Ban 1995-07 Input 
Management Boundary Line  1996-05 Input 
Mandatory Observer Coverage  1997-03 Output 
Recovery Plan Implementation for Western 
Stock, Effort Reduction 
1998-07 Input 
Vessel Registration 2000-08 Input 
Regulations Governing At-Sea Transfers to 
Farming Operations 
2000-10 Input 
IUU Vessel Blacklist 2003-08 Input 
Recovery Plan Implementation for 
Eastern/Mediterranean Stock, Effort Reduction 
2006-05 Input 
Capacity Reduction Program 2006-08 Input 
Catch Documentation Scheme 2007-04 Output 
Multilateral Trade Sanctions against CPCs  2008-06 Input 
Atlantic-Wide Research Programme for 
Bluefin Tuna (GBYP) 
2011-06 Input 
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES: 14  
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
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 For comparison, Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the ICCAT Recommendations 
and Resolutions taken to date in the bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna 
fisheries in that order. Note that there were 21, 38, and 4 ICCAT management 
measures implemented, in that order, for these fisheries since 1979 (ICCAT 2012b). 
 
Table 2. Summary of management tools used by ICCAT to manage bigeye tuna. 
BIGEYE TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW 
Fishery Management Tool ICCAT Recommendation/ 
Resolution Identification # 
and Year 
Type of 
Tool 
Minimum Size Limit 1997-01 Output 
Capacity Reduction 1997-13 Input 
Monitoring/ Enforcement Sanctions 1997-15 Output 
Vessel Registration 1998-02 Input 
 TAC Percentage Shares 2000-01 Output 
Implementation of a Multi-Year 
Conservation Plan 
2004-01 Input 
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES: 2  
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
 
Table 3. Summary of fishery management tools used by ICCAT to manage swordfish. 
SWORDFISH MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW 
 
Fishery Management Tool 
ICCAT Recommendation/ 
Resolution Identification # 
and Year 
 
Type of 
Tool 
Minimum Size Limit 1990-02 Output 
TAC Percentage Shares 1995-11 Output 
Management Boundary Split 1996-07 Input 
Rebuilding Plan Implementation for 
Swordfish 
1999-02 Input 
Time/Area Closures and Gear Restrictions 1999-04 Input 
Gear Restrictions for Bycatch Reduction  2000-03 Input 
Gear Restrictions for Fishing Mortality 
Reduction on Juvenile Swordfish 
2009-04 Input 
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES: 13  
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
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Table 4. Summary of management tools used by ICCAT to manage yellowfin tuna. 
YELLOWFIN TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW 
 
Fishery Management Tool 
ICCAT Recommendation/ 
Resolution Identification # 
and Year 
 
Type of 
Tool 
Minimum Size Limit 1972-01 Output 
Effort Reduction Program 1993-04 Input 
Request for CPC Implementation 
and Compliance with Rules 
1995-06 Input 
Repealing Minimum Size Limit 2005-01 Output 
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES: 0  
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
 
 ICCAT employs a variety of input and output fishery controls in the bigeye, 
bluefin, yellowfin tuna and swordfish fisheries.  While no discernable trend emerges 
in preference for specific usage of tools over time in each fishery, bluefin tuna have 
had significantly more and varied management measures implemented for them.  The 
total number of active management measures in place for bluefin tuna (14) is similar 
to the total of the other three fisheries (15).  However, there were more management 
measures implemented by ICCAT for bluefin tuna (64) than for these three other 
species combined (63) since its inception in 1969 (ICCAT 2012b).  Only the bluefin 
tuna fishery has a catch documentation/certification scheme, IUU vessel blacklist, 
multilateral trade sanctions against countries, TAC set-asides for research, mandatory 
observer coverage for the purse seine fleet and at-sea transferring of fish, or an 
Atlantic-wide research program in place (ICCAT 2012b).  Also, ICCAT seems as 
though it has been willing to implement more intensive management measures for its 
bluefin tuna fishery that require significant cooperation for monitoring and 
enforcement by CPCs than those used in other fisheries. 
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 ICCAT uses input measures such as time/area closures in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the banning of longlining in the Mediterranean Sea to protect spawning 
aggregations of bluefin tuna and to reduce bycatch of juvenile ICCAT-managed 
stocks, respectively (ICCAT 2010b).  Gear restrictions that ban the use of driftnets and 
spotter planes also ensure that planes do not guide purse seiners to find and capture 
entire schools of bluefin tuna, which is how that fishery rapidly developed in the past 
(ICCAT 2010b). ICCAT also uses output controls that focus on helping to accurately 
constrain total catch in the fishery (Pope 2012).  The percentage share TACs for CPCs 
under ICCAT’s management, certification schemes such as the bluefin catch 
documentation scheme, and mandatory observer coverage are examples of output 
controls. These tools contrast with typical input fisheries management tools used to 
reduce fishing effort and intensity (Pope 2012).  
 A second group of management measures unique to the bluefin tuna fishery 
relate to research and statistics.  Research set-asides of the overall TAC for each stock 
of bluefin tuna allow scientists to implement the Atlantic-Wide Research Program for 
Bluefin Tuna, or “Grande”.  Grande is funded by CPCs and implemented in various 
CPC countries through tagging programs and aerial surveys to estimate relative 
abundance of bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2012a).   
 Third, multilateral trade sanctions have been used against countries that flag 
vessels that have been found out of compliance with ICCAT requirements for 
participating in fisheries under their jurisdiction (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012a). This 
mechanism effectively removes the major buyers in the world bluefin tuna market 
from trade such as Japan, USA, and EU (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012a). Finally, measures 
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regarding the at-sea-transfer of live bluefin tuna to tow cages and net-pens for 
fattening only apply in the Mediterranean Sea. The mandatory observer coverage of 
such transfers seeks to reduce uncertainties over total catch of the 
Eastern/Mediterranean stock of bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2010b).   
  
     E.  Status of the Species 
 Current estimates suggest that Northern bluefin tuna stocks in the Atlantic 
Ocean and Mediterranean Sea represent about 30% of the 1970s population, which is 
when large-scale industrial fishing for the species began in earnest (Boustany 2011, 
Fromentin and Powers 2005, Safina and Klinger 2008, Aranda et al. 2010, ICCAT 
2010b).  This depleted status of the species in the Convention Area represents a 
failure, in biological terms, of ICCAT as a whole. These stock levels are not sufficient 
to support MSY, which is ICCAT’s stated management goal for every stock under its 
jurisdiction. The governments of Sweden, Kenya, and Monaco each sponsored 
motions to list the Atlantic bluefin tuna as “endangered” under Appendix I of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) in order to halt their sale worldwide (ICCAT 2010b, IUCN Redlist 2011, 
CITES 2012). Such protection would liken sale of bluefin tuna meat to trade in 
elephant ivory: an illegal act internationally. The poor spawning stock biomass of both 
bluefin tuna stocks in the Convention Area, coupled with various attempts to secure 
legal protection for the species in international fora strongly suggest that ICCAT is 
failing its management mandate to sustain stocks at MSY levels (Aranda et al. 2010). 
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 In light of this failure, I assessed the difference in management of the bluefin 
tuna fishery versus other ICCAT fisheries and their relative effectiveness according to 
whether or not they have helped ICCAT to reach its management goal of sustaining 
stocks at levels that sustain MSY according to ICCAT reports and other publications.  
As both bluefin tuna stocks are currently overfished, it seems as though every 
management tool has failed, but this is not necessarily the case.  Some tools, such as 
those that address the ranching of bluefin tuna that is unique to that fishery, have had a 
positive impact on the illegal transfer or live bluefin from catching vessels to net pens 
(ICIJ 2010, Pew 2010).  However, other tools that are not unique to the bluefin fishery 
have largely failed to curtail fishing effort or total mortality in the fishery (Sumaila 
and Huang 2012). I provide a master list of management tools evaluated in this thesis 
research with some indication of the success or failure of each and some context to lay 
the groundwork for the unique management in place in the bluefin tuna fishery (See 
Table 5). 
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Table 5. Master list of bluefin tuna management tools examined, effectiveness, and 
pecularities of bluefin tuna fishery that affect their success or failure. 
ICCAT 
Management 
Tool 
Success/ 
Failure 
 
Bluefin Fishery Context 
 
Minimum size 
limits 
 
Failure 
Immature bluefin tuna are still captured by purse 
seines for tuna ranching operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea, which undermines rebuilding 
spawning stock 
Time/area 
closures 
 
Failure 
Closures in the Gulf of Mexico and Tyrrhenian Sea 
have not measurably affected stock status 
Effort 
reduction  
 
Uncertain 
Effort reduced across Convention Area in aggregate, 
but bluefin tuna stocks remain overfished 
Total 
Allowable 
Catches 
(TACs) 
 
Success 
Countries share TAC allocations that have been set 
within scientific recommendations; 2012 estimates 
show both stocks are increasing in abundance 
Gear 
restrictions 
Failure Have not reduced total catch or mortality 
Mandatory 
observer 
coverage 
Failure Have not reduced IUU fishing overall 
 
Catch 
documentation 
 
Failure 
Have not significantly reduced IUU fishing, 
currently being replaced by ICCAT for 2013 fishing 
year with electronic program 
Vessel 
blacklist 
Failure Have not succeeded in permanently removing 
offending vessels from fishery 
 
Research set-
asides 
 
Uncertain 
Led to increased scientific understanding of bluefin 
tuna life history, but not have not informed 
management changes as hoped 
Management 
units for stocks 
 
Failure 
Splitting bluefin tuna into two stocks has not 
reduced fishing effort or mortality on the whole 
 
Recovery plans 
 
Success 
Agreed-upon management frameworks with 
scientifically based reference points and timelines 
for rebuilding have helped stocks 
Capacity 
reduction  
 
Uncertain 
Capacity reduced in some of the Convention Area, 
but in aggregate have not reduced fishing effort 
Vessel 
registration 
Failure Unregistered vessels continue to pursue bluefin tuna 
every fishing year 
Data from ICCAT 2012b, ICCAT 2008. 
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 Based on my assessment of these tools, only two of thirteen major 
management tool categories employed in the bluefin tuna fishery have been successful 
to date in measurably reducing total fishing mortality (total catch) and fishing effort 
(amount of time spent fishing) for bluefin tuna in the ICCAT Convention Area.  Effort 
reduction, capacity reduction, and research set-asides have all had uncertain outcomes 
in terms of buoying stock status to MSY-sustaining levels because their impacts are 
difficult to measure without reliable numbers.  Two out of thirteen successful tools is a 
fairly bad measure by any count, but ICCAT itself may not be to blame for the failure 
of most of the tools it employs in the bluefin tuna fishery. 
 There should be some consideration of the nature and peculiarities of the 
bluefin tuna fishery that affect the relative effectiveness of each tool. The majority of 
the fishing pressure on bluefin tuna is exerted in the Mediterranean Sea by about a 
dozen countries from many different ports with different abilities to effectively police 
their waters and enforce ICCAT binding Recommendations and voluntary 
Resolutions.  There is no ICCAT inspection team that scans the Mediterranean to 
enforce their rules.  Rather, monitoring and enforcement of minimum size limits, gear 
restrictions, time/area closures, vessel blacklists, accurate registration, and catch 
documentation are up to each individual Contracting Party Country. Therefore, it is 
perhaps not surprising that many of these tools have failed in the ICCAT Convention 
Area, but not for lack of trying.  ICCAT is only as strong as its CPCs, and political 
will, funding, and resources must be allocated by each respective country to ensure 
that tools are effective in sustaining stocks at MSY-sustaining levels.  It is through this 
lens of the failure of various management tools that we must consider the factors that 
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contribute to their adoption and success or failure over time for the remainder of this 
thesis research. Failure of specific management tools and in an aggregate failure of 
ICCAT to sustain healthy bluefin tuna stocks under its management are strong drivers 
for the specific management framework in place currently (Aranda et al. 2010). 
 
     F.  ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Fishery Compared to Global Tuna Fisheries 
 While a large amount of information has been published on the management of 
Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna in the past several decades, harvest of this species 
accounted for less than 10% of tuna catch in the world’s oceans by weight in 2010 
(FAO 2011, See Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Contributions of commercial tuna species to world tuna catch in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from FAO 2011, pg.3 
 
 I want to explore why this is the case.  I am interested in the poor stock status 
of the species, the popularity of ICCAT management of the stock in fisheries 
management literature, and the general causal statements regarding the collapse of this 
species in published documents. To investigate these areas of interest, I examine the 
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characteristics of the fishery to clarify and understand the factors that contribute to 
bluefin tuna management.  In this thesis, I provide background information on bluefin 
tuna and the fisheries that developed to catch it. I explore the factors that contribute to 
its management in Chapters II and III.  Some of the most common explanations for the 
specific management tools ICCAT employs in the bluefin tuna fishery are discussed in 
Chapter III.  In Chapter IV, I discuss a literature review and key informant interview 
methodology used to test my six hypotheses.  Chapters V and VI describe my findings 
and results, and provide a discussion and policy recommendations for ICCAT based 
on this thesis research. 
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CHAPTER II.  BACKGROUND OF THE SPECIES AND THE FISHERY 
     1.  The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
     A.  Biology 
 Northern Atlantic bluefin are the largest of the three bluefin tuna species and 
are capable of growing to over ten feet in length and weighing nearly 1,500 pounds 
(Mather et al. 1995, See Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.  Typical horizontal and vertical distribution of tunas in the water column. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
FAO 2012b, pg. 4. 
 Bluefin tuna must swim continuously to push oxygenated water over their gills 
to breathe, which forces them to adopt a highly migratory lifestyle (Mather et al. 1995, 
Maggio 2000, Ehrenberg 2008).  
 
     B.  Life History 
 As a result of their physiology and highly migratory lifestyle, bluefin tuna 
expend energy keeping themselves warm while they hunt in cold waters, and thus 
spend relatively less time growing large or producing eggs or milt for spawning (Porch 
2005, Teo et al. 2006). Bluefin tuna stocks often fluctuation in abundance 
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considerably over time, which makes it difficult to reliably estimate their abundance 
and biomass and to manage fisheries for them (Mather et al. 1995, Porch 2005). 
Without accurate estimates of biomass, it is difficult to set harvest guidelines for stock 
(Porch 2005). Thus, bluefin tuna have a high susceptibility to overexploitation and low 
resiliency of its stocks to overfishing (Porch 2005).   
 Bluefin tuna typically spawn in large aggregations in warm waters in the Gulf 
of Mexico and in the Mediterranean Sea (Porch 2005). Data from multiple tagging 
studies suggest that western Atlantic-origin bluefin that spawn in the Gulf of Mexico 
have a median spawning age, or age of maturity, of nearly eleven to twelve years 
(Block et al. 2001).  This contrasts the estimate four- to five-year median age of 
maturity of bluefin that spawn in the Mediterranean Sea (NMFS 2011). Reliable 
patterns of spawning migrations make the species susceptible to overfishing because 
large schools of spawning fish are easily targeted by fishers (NMFS 2011). 	  
     C.  Complex Migrations  
 Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna were split into two stocks for management 
considerations based on total Atlantic Ocean catch in 1980 according to their 
migratory patterns across the Atlantic basin, called mixing (Powers and Porch 2004).  
Bluefin abundance varies in these areas based on a number of factors such as 
recruitment, food availability, oceanic currents, and other environmental factors 
(Galuardi et al. 2010, See Figure 4). The current state of the debate over the two stocks 
is that it is not reflective of the biology of the fish and should be replaced by another 
management framework in the future. 
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Figure 4. Estimated tracks of adult bluefin tuna tagged in the western Atlantic Ocean 
based on satellite data from 2005 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from Galuardi et al. 2010. Figure 3, pg. 971. Note: Individual bluefin swim 
from one side of the Atlantic to the other in a given year. 
  
 The extent to which mixing occurs in spawning areas and feeding grounds 
remains hotly-contested in the scientific literature and fishing industry publications 
because it affects how shares of total catch of bluefin are divided among countries by 
ICCAT (Lutcavage 2001, Powers and Porch 2004, Secor et al. 2011).  
 
     2.  Description of the Fisheries for Bluefin Tuna 
     A. Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea Fishery History 
 The fishery for bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea is one of the oldest 
documented fisheries in the world, as evidenced by cave paintings on the islands of 
Sicily that date back to circa 4000 BC (Desse and Desse-Berset 1994, Mather et al. 
1995, Whynott 1995, Maggio 2000, FAO 2012). Fishers operated elaborate walled-net 
pen traps, called tonnaras, to catch out-migrating tuna that had spawned in the 
Mediterranean Sea as early as 2000 BC (Maggio 2000, FAO 2012, See Figure 5).   
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Figure 5. Diagram of a traditional tonnara, or fish trap made of net pens anchored to 
shore and the seafloor, from Sicily (Maggio 2000). 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Figure from: Un Mare D’Mare. 2012.  
  
In Maggio’s ethnographic work La Mattanza, she highlights the symbolic and cultural 
importance of the annual bluefin migration: 
 The bluefin were to ancient Mediterranean peoples what the buffalo was  
 to the American Plains Indian: a yearly miracle, a reliable source of protein 
 from a giant animal they revered, one that passed in such numbers that the 
 cooperation of an entire tribe was needed to kill them and preserve their meat. 
 Around the Mediterranean the migrating bluefin was a staple food for entire 
 civilizations (Maggio 2000, pg. 10). 
 
 Various Mediterranean islands had thriving tuna fishing and salting industries 
since the thirteenth century, and harpooning, seining, and drift netting have been 
commonly employed since (Mather et al. 1995, Maggio 2000).  There is evidence of 
tuna spotting towers excavated at Cosa in modern day Italy from 100 BC (McCann et 
al. 1987).  Despite changes in the fisheries for bluefin tuna, the species remains very 
important across the Mediterranean region and beyond (ICCAT 2012a). 
 
     B.  Common Methods of Capture  
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 The majority of bluefin tuna caught in the Convention Area are captured by 
purse seines, longlines, baitboats, and rod and reel fishers (ICCAT 2012a).  These 
methods were developed based on the attributes of bluefin, such as their migratory 
patterns and aggregating habits when spawning (FAO 2012c, See Figure 6). 
  
Figure 6. Common fishing methods around Atlantic Ocean. Clockwise from top right: 
1. purse seining; 2. bottom trawling; 3. mid-water trawling; 4. drift netting; 5. 
longlining; 6. hook and line or trolling; 7. harpooning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from: Joseph Shoulak Illustrations, WSJ Graphics, in:  The Wall Street Journal 
“The Slippery Business of Picking Fish”. 2 March 2011. 
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 Purse seining is a common bluefin tuna fishing method and works by 
encircling a school of bluefin with a large net and then pulling the bottom of the net 
closed with a running line, like closing a purse.  This method is used almost 
exclusively in the Mediterranean to supply tuna fattening operations (Pew 2010, 
ICCAT 2010a).  Bottom trawling and mid-water trawling and drift netting are 
unselective methods of capture and have been banned in the ICCAT Convention Area 
due to high incidence of killing non-target species, called bycatch (ICCAT 2010a, Pew 
2010). Longlines are fishing lines with many baited hooks that capture fish by hooking 
and holding them until they are pulled in, and are used extensively throughout the 
Atlantic Ocean (Mather et al. 1995, Tudela 2004).  
 Hook and line fishers and trollers pull lines with baited hooks through the 
water column on small boats with machinery or rods and reels (Mather et al. 1995).  
Bluefin fishers off the coast of North America typically “chunk” or “chum” dead, cut 
up baitfish to create “slicks” of blood that attract them to baited hooks (Whynott 
1995).  This method is very selective, as species captured are precisely targeted and 
undersized or undesirable fish can be released alive, unlike many of the other methods 
described here (Ravier and Fromentin 2001, Tudela 2004). Harpoon fishing is 
employed in select regions of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea, especially in the 
Gulf of Maine off the coast of North America.  This method specifically targets 
“giant” –bluefin tuna larger than 73 inches near the surface of the water. This method 
is highly selective because the harpooner must physically see and judge the size of the 
fish before the throw is made to secure the tuna to a line and pull it aboard the vessel 
(Whynott 1995, ABTA 2012). 
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      C.  History of the Western Atlantic Fishery 
 The western Atlantic fishery for bluefin tuna is significantly younger and 
decidedly different than the Mediterranean fishery. Trophy sportfishing for giant (> 
1,000 pounds) bluefin tuna along “Tuna Alley” near Nova Scotia started in earnest in 
the 1930s, and by the 1940s a small market emerged for their meat (Mather et al. 
1995).  In the 1950s, trolling and trapping methods for smaller fish developed using 
more efficient methods such as live bait, pelagic longline, and purse seining. They 
were largely driven by developments in the Japanese fishing and trade markets 
(Whynott 1995).  These methods were much more capital and gear-intensive, but 
allowed fishers to take larger harvests and more fish per trip (Mather et al. 1995). By 
the late 1960s, bluefin tuna were declining in the western Atlantic waters (Mather et 
al. 1995). As a direct result of the increased attention to the declining stocks of bluefin 
tuna, ICCAT was formed in 1966 (ICCAT 2006).  In doing so, ICCAT became one of 
the world’s first RFMOs, and the Convention Area was established as most of the 
Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (ICCAT 2006, See Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Map of RFMO jurisdictions; ICCAT jurisdiction is represented in orange. 
 
FAO. 2012f. pg. 4. 
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      D.  Development of Ranching in the Mediterranean Sea 
 The development of the bluefin tuna ranching, or aquaculture industry in the 
Mediterranean Sea in the 1990s has important implications for how the eastern 
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea fishery is managed. Ranching involves capturing wild 
tuna and placing them in offshore net pens to be fattened, while aquaculture involves 
growing bluefin tuna in captivity for their entire lives (Pew 2010). Juvenile bluefin 
tuna are captured for fattening in pens almost exclusively by purse seines, because 
they can capture entire schools of fish and transfer them to tow cages for transport to 
stationary net pens at tuna ranches (Ehrenberg 2008, Pew 2010, See Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. A tow-cage transferring bluefin tuna to a net pen for fattening.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from ICIJ 2010. pg. 16. 
  
 The fish are fattened to increase the quality of their meat to obtain higher 
prices in the market (FAO 2012d). The industry developed directly in response to 
seasonal shortages of fatty bluefin tuna that fetch high prices at Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish 
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Market (Issenberg 2007). Bluefin tuna are by far the most heavily farmed or ranched 
fish in the Mediterranean Sea (FAO 2012d). Importantly, this industry is non-existent 
in the western Atlantic Ocean because spawning aggregations that are required to 
supply fish to the ranches do not occur nearshore as they do in the Mediterranean Sea 
(Ehrenberg 2008). It is highly unlikely that this practice beginning in the western 
Atlantic Ocean.  Croatia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Malta currently lead production of 
ranched bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea (FAO 2012d).  
   
      3. Demand of the Sushi Market Drives Bluefin Prices  
 The market for bluefin tuna meat is driven by the rapid expansion of the 
world’s sushi industry since the 1970s, which relies upon the invention of flash-
freezing technology, high-speed trucking, and logistical breakthroughs in overnight 
flights to Tokyo (Bestor 2001, Issenberg 2007, NMFS 2010b). The most valuable 
portion of the tuna, the honmaguro or kuromaguro, is the deep red, fat-marbled flesh 
that is seen in sushi restaurants (Bestor 2001). Single bluefin tuna have sold for several 
hundred thousand U.S. dollars in recent years (Collette et al. 2011). 
   
     4.  Relative Stock Statuses of Eastern/Western Bluefin Tuna Stocks 
 
 The prime conservation problem for tunas is the depletion of... bluefin  
 (FAO 2012f pg. 4).  
 
 This section provides background information on the two stocks of Northern 
Atlantic bluefin tuna, (western Atlantic and eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea) and 
the relative health of each stock. There is considerable debate surrounding the 
scientifically based stock status of ICCAT-managed bluefin tuna.  On the one hand, 
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the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the National 
Geographic Society, popular media, and many other groups suggest that both stocks of 
bluefin tuna are “endangered” throughout the ICCAT Convention Area (IUCN 
“Redlist,” National Geographic Society 2012).  On the other hand, there is a 
perception among industry groups that there is no such decline (ABTA 2010).  
 Currently, the eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stock is both still overfished 
and overfishing is still occurring (ICCAT 2010a, See Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Estimates of eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea bluefin stock biomass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from ICCAT 2012c, pg. 98. Note: Dashes indicate 80% confidence intervals. 
  
 This means that both the level fishing mortality (overfished) and level of 
fishing effort (overfishing) remain too high to sustain Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) in the long-term, which is ICCAT’s stated management goal for the stock 
(ICCAT 2010a). Overfishing a stock means subjecting a stock to a fishing mortality 
rate (F) that exceeds the fishing mortality rate associated with MSY (FMSY) (Hilborn 
2005, Kell et al. 2012). The estimated mass of spawning-age adults is estimated to be 
57% of the highest recorded levels in the past few decades for the Eastern 
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Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stock (ICCAT 2010a). The stock biomass has not declined 
to the degree seen the western Atlantic, but ranching and aquaculture operations as 
well as significant latent fishing capacity in the form of many boats in port waiting to 
fish make bluefin’s status in the Mediterranean Sea quite fragile (Porch 2005).  
 The western Atlantic stock is also overfished and overfishing is still occurring 
(ICCAT 2010a).  The spawning stock biomass of the western Atlantic stock is 
currently estimated to be less than 30% of pre-1970 collapsed levels (ICCAT 2010a).  
This biomass is too low to sustain MSY, and has caused considerable concern among 
fisheries managers and conservation groups (ICCAT 2010a, See Figure 10, Table 5).  
 
Figure 10. Estimates of western Atlantic bluefin tuna spawning stock biomass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from ICCAT 2010c, pg. 76. Note: Dashes indicate 80% confidence intervals. 
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Table 6. Summary of ICCAT-managed species’ stock status from stock assessments.  
NON- TUNA 
SPECIES 
Stocks, Year 
Assessed 
MSY in metric 
tonnes 
Stock Status 
Atlantic 
Swordfish 
Northern – 2010 
 
Southern - 2010 
13,000 – 14,000 
 
15,000 
Neither Stock Overfished, 
Overfishing Not 
Occurring 
Mediterranean 
Swordfish 
2009 14,600 Overfished, Overfishing is 
Occurring 
Sailfish Western – 2009 
 
Eastern - 2009 
600 – 1,100  
 
1,250 – 1,950 
Western/Eastern Stocks 
Overfished, Overfishing is 
Occurring 
White Marlin 2006 600 – 1,300 Overfished, Overfishing is 
Occurring 
Blue Marlin 2011 1,000 – 2,400 Overfished, Overfishing is 
Occurring 
 
Tuna 
Species 
Stocks, Year 
Assessed 
MSY or Proxy in 
metric tonnes 
Stock Status 
Albacore 
Thunnus 
alalunga 
Northern - 2009 
 
Southern - 2011 
 
Mediterranean – 2011 
29,000 
 
23,000 – 98,000 
 
No MSY proxy 
 
Northern/Southern 
Stocks Overfished, 
Overfishing 
Occurring 
Mediterranean Stock 
Status Unknown 
Bigeye 
Thunnus 
obesus 
2010 78,000 – 102,000 
 
Not Overfished, 
Overfishing Not 
Occurring 
Bluefin 
Thunnus 
thynnus 
Western – 2010 
 
Eastern/ 
Mediterranean – 
2010 
2,500 
 
13,500 
 
Eastern/Western 
Stocks Overfished, 
Overfishing 
Occurring 
 
Skipjack 
Katsuwonus 
pelamis 
Western – 2008 
 
Eastern/ 
Mediterranean - 2008 
30,000 – 36,000 
 
143,000 – 170,000 
Neither Stock 
Overfished, 
Overfishing Not 
Occurring 
Yellowfin 
Thunnus 
albacares 
2011 115,000 – 145,000 
 
Overfished, 
Overfishing Not 
Occurring 
Small Tunas 
Group  
No assessment 
available 
No MSY proxy Stock Status 
Unknown 
Data from ICCAT 2012a. 
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 Importantly, bluefin tuna is the only ICCAT species for which all of its stocks 
are overfished and currently experiencing overfishing (ICCAT 2010a). 
 
     5. Common Explanations for Complex Management of Bluefin Tuna  
 The biological peculiarities of bluefin, their high market value, political 
pressures, history of management, and capital-intensive fisheries make them unique 
and particularly vulnerable to overexploitation because mature adults can be targeted 
in large schools during spawning migrations to known areas year after year (Porch 
2005, Webster 2011). Several common theories in fisheries economics and 
management literature seek to explain the management framework in place for, and 
decline of, bluefin tuna; these common explanations are the foundation of this thesis. 
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 A common argument for why bluefin tuna stocks have generally declined and 
for their unique management is rooted in Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(Hardin 1968). This idea is pervasive in economics literature, the popular media, and 
even marine resource management literature (Nickler 1999, McWhinnie 2006, Revkin 
2008 in The New York Times, The Economist 2008, Sumaila and Huang 2012).  A 
simple Internet search for the terms “tragedy of the commons, bluefin tuna” returns 
nearly 8,000 results. Many of these are publications on conservation organizations’ 
websites, teachers’ lessons, marine conservation blogs, and respected international 
sources of information such as the UK’s Guardian and The New York Times.  
 The widely accepted primary reason for the current state of this stock is  
 its common property and shared stock status, which together can easily drive 
 exploiters of a given natural resource into non-cooperative behaviour, known 
 as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Sumaila and Huang 2012, pg. 502). 
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 Applying the “Tragedy of the Commons” idea to explain decline in bluefin 
tuna fisheries is inappropriate, however (Buck-Cox 1985, Hanna 1990).  ICCAT 
member countries are clear user groups that adopt management measures to govern 
the collective actions of the group of fishers. Bluefin tuna fishing has existed since the 
tonnara operated in Roman times, and governance structures have continuously 
shaped these practices (Maggio 2000, Longo and Clausen 2011).  ICCAT has also 
rebuilt overfished swordfish stocks using similar management tools to those used in 
the bluefin fishery, which highlights that a “tragedy” or collapse of the resource is not 
imminent (ICCAT 2008). 
 Some academics contribute the decline of bluefin tuna instead to the species’ 
extremely high market value. They argue that cultural norms to “leave fish for the next 
year” that regulated how traditional tonnara and other fishing methods that have 
operated for millennia have been undermined by capitalistic forces (Maggio 2000, 
Longo and Clausen 2011).  Further, they argue that changing fisheries for Atlantic 
bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea reflect the “Tragedy of the Commodity”: 
Modern ABFT production, born of capitalist private property and the unending 
quest to maximize surplus value, became the form-determinant of fishing  
methods, technology, and the labor process in the modern era, resulting in a  
host of social and ecological contradictions (Longo and Clausen 2011, pg. 324). 
 
 Under this explanation, the high market prices paid for bluefin tuna led directly 
to the development of capital- and technology-intensive modern fisheries for the 
species as well as government subsidies throughout the EU and Mediterranean 
countries (Foster et al. 2010).  Too many boats are built to catch decreasing numbers 
of fish each year (Miyake and Kebe 1996, Clausen et al. 2011, FAO 2012a).  Industry 
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groups pressure their respective governments for higher quotas to cover the high 
capital costs they sink into the fishery, and governments respond with subsidies and 
pressure on ICCAT Commissioners to push for TACs that are much higher than the 
scientifically-based TAC recommended by the ICCAT SCRS (ICIJ 2010, Longo and 
Clausen 2011). Against this backdrop, bluefin tuna TAC allocations and management 
became a much larger battle over continuation of cultural practices, food security, and 
employment (Longo and Clausen 2011). In addition, high market prices of bluefin 
from the expanding popularity of sushi led to infusion of international capital and 
intense marketing campaigns that allowed the bluefin tuna became a “boutique 
species” (Safina 2001) that has low use value but high market value (Issenberg 2007). 
 A third argument has been put forward that suggests that the best available 
science on which ICCAT purports to base its management decisions has been highly 
politicized.  Some argue that the leading scientific advice over time has been 
undermined, ignored, or even shelved before becoming public or presented at ICCAT 
meetings in response to political pressure within member country delegations 
(Whynott 1995, Fromentin and Powers 2005, Porch 2005, MacKenzie et al. 2008). 
Further, the same authors argue that imperfect or incomplete science has been seized, 
co-opted, and exploited by various interest groups to argue for or against specific 
management changes (Whynott 1995, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Ruais 2011): 
We hypothesize that authorities have been unwilling or unable to resist  
political pressure by the bluefin tuna fishing industry to implement  
recommended measures... (MacKenzie et al. 2008, pg. 30). 
 
 A fourth argument hinges upon the idea that “free-riders,” or parties that are 
not party to ICCAT and disregard management rules, undermine the effectiveness of 
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conserving the resource and drive depletion of bluefin tuna (McWhinnie 2006).  There 
are several examples of “free riders” engaged in bluefin tuna fishing in the Eastern 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea such as Bolivia and Georgia, so this theory has a 
factual basis (McWhinnie 2006, Pew 2010, Ruais 2011). Catches of bluefin tuna from 
free riders make up a small percentage of the estimated IUU fishing in a given year, 
whereas IUU fishing from CPCs can be very large (Pew 2010, ICIJ 2010). 
 The fact that bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea 
constitute a resource that is shared among 48 CPCs and 5 Cooperating Non-Members 
makes their management particularly difficult to coordinate. In a 2010 book on 
international environmental governance, Conca and Dabelko summarize the challenge 
that all RFMOs like ICCAT face: 
 Just as state sovereignty imposes a pattern of political authority that does  
 not correspond exactly to the underlying ecological reality, so transnational 
 capitalism imposes patterns of economic activity that do not wholly  
 correspond to the prevailing pattern of political authority. Both features  
 of system structure give environmental problems an inherently transnational 
 dimension, and both greatly complicate the prospects for global cooperation. 
 (Conca and Dabelko 2010, pg. 59). 
 
 These four common explanations will be reviewed for their merit and 
appropriateness for helping to describe the current overfished status of both stocks of 
bluefin tuna and the reasons for adoption of specific management tools in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER III.  ICCAT MANAGEMENT OF BLUEFIN TUNA 
     1.  History of ICCAT Management 
     A.  ICCAT History and Fisheries Management Framework 
 Understanding ICCAT itself is essential to grasping its methods of 
management. After urging from the FAO Fisheries Governing Body in 1966, the 
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas was signed and entered into force 
in 1969 (ICCAT 2011a). The Preamble of the Convention states ICCAT’s goal: 
 ...to co-operate in maintaining the populations of [tuna] at levels which  
 will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes 
 (ICCAT 2011a in Foreword). 
 
 The objective of sustaining maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is a common 
goal of many fisheries management regimes (FAO 2012d). The goal is to harvest a 
species at about half of the total biomass their environment can sustain for that species 
because stock growth rate is highest at that point (See Figure 10). 
 
Figure 11. Diagram showing the theoretical point intersection of maximum growth in 
biomass (on the x-axis) and corresponding MSY (on the y-axis) of a fish stock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: ICCAT 2012i, Figure 9 pg. 64. 
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 ICCAT is comprised of 48 Contracting Party Countries, including several 
parties that are not even adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean, making it the largest RFMO in 
the world (ICCAT 2011a, See Table 6). 
 
Table 7. CPCs and cooperating fishing entities involved in ICCAT. 
CPCs and Cooperators Status 
United States, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, Canada, France* (on 
behalf of St-Pierre et Miquelon), Brazil, Morocco, Republic of 
Korea, Cote D’Ivoire, Angola, Russia, Gabon, Cape Verde, 
Uruguay, Sao Tome e Principe, Venezuela, Equatorial Guinea, 
Republic of Guinea, United Kingdom* (on behalf of the Oceanic 
Territories), Libya, People’s Republic of China, Croatia, 
European Union, Tunisia, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Namibia, Barbados, Honduras, Algeria, Mexico, Vanuatu, 
Iceland, Turkey, Philippines, Norway, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
Senegal, Belize, Syria, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Nigeria, 
Egypt, Albania, Sierra Leone, and Mauritania 
48 Contracting 
Parties. Any 
United 
Nations 
country, 
specialized 
UN agency, or 
inter-
governmental 
economic 
organization 
may join 
ICCAT 
Chinese Taipei, Guyana, Curacao, Colombia, and Suriname 5 Cooperating 
Non-
Contracting 
Parties, or 
Fishing 
Entities in 
ICCAT 
Cuba, Benin, Spain**, Portugal**, Italy**, Cyprus**, and 
Malta** are no longer Contracting Parties due to accession of the 
European Community to ICCAT in 2004 (ICCAT 2012g). 
7 CPCs are no 
longer active 
in ICCAT 
Data from ICCAT 2012g. Note: France and the UK represent St. Pierre et Miquelon & 
Ascension Island, respectively, and are denoted with an asterisk (*).  All other 
European Union (EU) Member Parties are superseded in this Convention as a result of 
agreements with the European Community and are denoted with a double asterisk (**) 
 
 
     B.  ICCAT-Managed Species 
ICCAT manages over thirty species of fish and sharks (ICCAT 2012f, See Table 7). 
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Table 8.  Major ICCAT managed species. 
ICCAT Managed Species’ Common Name Species’ Scientific Name 
Atlantic bluefin tuna Thunnus thynnus 
Skipjack tuna Katsuwonus pelamis 
Yellowfin tuna Thunnus albacares 
Albacore tuna Thunnus alalunga 
Bigeye tuna Thunnus obesus 
Black skipjack tuna Euthynnus alletteratus 
Frigate tuna Auxis thazard 
Atlantic bonito Sarda sarda 
Swordfish Xiphias gladius 
White marlin Tetrapturus albidus 
Blue marlin Makaira nigricans 
Sailfish Istiophorus albicans 
Spearfish Tetrapturus pfluegeri 
Spanish mackerel Scomberomorus maculatus 
King mackerel Scomberomorus cavalla 
Data from ICCAT 2012f in “Introduction.”  
 
     C.  Structure and Specific Responsibilities of ICCAT 
 ICCAT is responsible for the conservation of tunas in the Atlantic Ocean and 
adjacent seas, which it achieves through collecting and disseminating fisheries 
statistics and data, coordinating research, and developing management plans. ICCAT’s 
area of jurisdiction, or Convention Area, encompasses all of the Atlantic Ocean and 
the Mediterranean Sea (ICCAT 2006). The ICCAT organization itself is made up of a 
Commission body, a secretariat headquartered in Madrid, permanent Working Groups, 
and four Panels (ICCAT 2012b). A Standing Committee on Research and Statistics 
(SCRS) provides the Commission with impartial, objective scientific information to 
frame discussions over recommendations and resolutions that the Commission may 
choose to enact (Porch 2005, ICCAT 2012b).  The SCRS is comprised of CPC 
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scientists, and their peer-reviewed findings are presented to ICCAT to inform harvest 
decisions and TAC allocations (ICCAT 2012b).  Formal Recommendations and 
Resolutions are also based upon these publications and findings (ICCAT 2012b). 
 ICCAT has four permanent committees: the Standing Committee on Research 
and Statistics (SCRS); Standing Committee on Finance and Administration; 
Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee; and Permanent 
Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures 
(ICCAT 2012b). Four Panels discuss a species group or specific species (ICCAT 
2012a).  Panel 1 concerns tropical tunas such as skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye; Panel 
2 deals with northern temperate tunas including Northern albacore and Northern 
Atlantic bluefin tuna; Panel 3 works with southern temperate tunas such as Southern 
albacore and swordfish; and Panel 4 advises on all other species, such as bycatch 
species (ICCAT 2012g, NMFS 2012a). 
 
     2.  ICCAT’s Two-Stock Hypothesis 
     A.  History of the 2-Stock Hypothesis 
 Though the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna is one species that inhabits the 
entirety of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, ICCAT has been managing the 
fishery as if it were composed of two separate stocks ever since the 1980s (Porch 
2005). This peculiarity is due to the fact that ICCAT scientists assumed that migrating 
bluefin return annually to spawning grounds they have used before, which may not be 
accurate (ICCAT 1995). The majority of bluefin tuna catch was made close to either 
side of the Atlantic Ocean in those years, making this management arrangement 
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convenient (ICCAT 1995, Mather et al. 1995).  As a result of this convenience, a 
management boundary line was drawn at the 45-degree meridian to separate the 
Eastern Atlantic /Mediterranean Sea stock from the Western Atlantic stock (Mather et 
al. 1995. Whynott 1995, ICCAT 1995, See Figure 11). 
 
Figure 12. Illustration of ICCAT’s east-west management boundary line (in bold). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image from ICCAT 2012f, pg. 90. 
 
 The line is somewhat arbitrary and not reflective of the actual biology of the 
species, which frequently swim beyond this political boundary (Whynott 1995, Porch 
2005).  According to an ICCAT report from a 2001 workshop on bluefin “mixing,” or 
swimming across the management boundary:  
 The dividing line was based on the distribution of catches and some notion  
 of the midpoints between the continents (ICCAT 2010a, pg. 367).   
  
     B.  Eastern or Western Stock?  Why does it Matter? 
 The debate over the accuracy of the two-stock hypothesis is a critical one for 
bluefin tuna management because ICCAT CPCs share a portion of the total TAC, or 
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quota, of each stock.  Imagine the two “stocks” (eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea 
and western Atlantic) as two pies that when combined represent the total ICCAT 
bluefin TAC in a fishing season.  The western Atlantic stock, or pie, is small and 
shared by three countries: the U.S., Canada, and Japan.  The Eastern 
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea pie is about five times the size, because bluefin are more 
abundant there, and is shared among dozens of countries.  When a party catches a 
bluefin in a specific area of the Convention Area, it gets counted as a slice against that 
specific pie.  If that individual fish was not actually born on the side of the 
management boundary where it was caught, then the counting is inaccurate, and the 
pies are no longer divided equitably as they were intended by ICCAT.   
 Due to the uncertain degree of mixing of bluefin tuna over the Convention 
Area, parties can become adversarial over perceived inequities in allocation of the 
valuable bluefin tuna resource (Porch 2005).  If scientists attribute an incorrect 
proportion of fish caught to one stock or the other, then stock assessments for both 
sides become compromised because the total TAC shares are no longer divided up 
based on relative sizes of each stock. ICCAT’s SCRS acknowledges the problems that 
this mixing can introduce for managers: 
 ...even small rates of mixing from East to West can have significant effects  
 on the West due to the fact that Eastern plus Mediterranean resource is much 
 larger than that of the West (ICCAT 2012a, pg. 85).    
 
     3.  ICCAT Management Context 
     A.  Managing a Migratory Species  
 Bluefin are a highly migratory species, or a “straddling stock” as they are 
known in international legal regimes, and they swim beyond national jurisdictions in 
	  	  38	  
the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (UN LOS Convention III 1982, United 
Nations Conference Conf.A. 164/38, 1995).  When fish swim beyond the boundaries 
of any one state in the open ocean, or into the “High Seas,” they are managed 
exclusively by ICCAT (ICCAT 2011a).  While an estimated 90% of commercial and 
recreational fish are caught within EEZs of states, the bluefin tuna fishery doesn’t 
follow this pattern, making its management complex (Juda 2008).  Specific fishery 
management tools are required to manage such transboundary stocks (Weber 2002).	  
   
     B.  Stock Management Measures  
 ICCAT has applied many fishery management tools to limit fishing effort and 
constrain total catch of both stocks in the bluefin tuna fishery (ICCAT 2012b, Table 
5). Different tools employed for the eastern and western stocks (See Tables 8 and 9).  
 
Table 9. Overview of western Atlantic management tools. 
WESTERN ATLANTIC MEASURES 
Recommendation 
Year - Number 
Measure Type Measure Goal 
1974-01 Minimum Size  Reduce juvenile mortality 
1982-01 Closed 
Season/Area 
Protect spawning aggregations in Gulf of 
Mexico 
1991-01 National Shares 
of TAC 
Percentage sharing of TAC among CPCs 
and Cooperating Non-Members 
1993-05 Certification 
Scheme 
Reduce sale of IUU fish, reduce total catch 
in fishery 
1996-04 Research Set-
Aside 
Portion of annual quota dedicated to 
scientific research program 
1998-07 Rebuilding Plan Rebuild Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) to 
levels that support MSY by 2019 
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
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Table 10. Overview of eastern Atlantic management tools. 
EASTERN ATLANTIC/MEDITERRANEAN SEA MEASURES 
Measure Year, # Measure Type Measure Goal 
1992-01 Catch 
Certification 
Certify origin of landed fish to accurately 
allocate quota shares, reduce IUU fishing 
1993-07 Closed 
Season/Area 
Mediterranean Sea closed to longlining, 
reduces mortality in Tyrrhenian Sea 
1994-11 Capacity 
Reduction 
Reduce fishing effort to 1995 levels, 
reduce catch by 25% from those years  
1995-04 Research Set-
Aside 
Allocate quota share for scientific tagging 
research program 
1996-03 Minimum Size 
Limit 
Reduce juvenile mortality 
1998-05 National Shares 
of TAC 
Percentage sharing of TAC among CPCs 
and Cooperating Non-Members 
2006-05 Stock Rebuilding 
Plan 
Rebuild Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) 
to levels that support MSY by 2023 
2006-07 Farming Capacity 
Reduction 
Better monitoring of total catch, transfer 
of tuna to net-pens, reduce IUU fishing 
2007-04 TAC Overages 
Payback Program 
Allow over-quota catches in one year to 
be repaid with lower allocation in future  
2007-10 Mandatory Trade 
Reporting 
Requirement 
Mandatory declaration of farmed bluefin 
trade from CPCs, Cooperating Non-
Members to reduce IUU fishing 
2008-06 Multilateral Trade 
Sanctions 
Reduce IUU fishing, activities that 
undermine ICCAT management 
2009-06 Capacity 
Reduction 
“Drastic reductions in fishing capacity for 
all Parties” (ICCAT 2010b pg.5). 
Data from ICCAT 2012b.  
 
 Unique management tools are used in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea 
to constrain effort, reduce fishing and farming or ranching capacity, and to reign in 
total catch (Porch 2005).  Due to these unique threats to the eastern stock stemming 
from ranching and high levels of IUU fishing, there is a corresponding increase in the 
number and type of management measures employed to govern that fishery (Pew 
	  	  40	  
2010, ICIJ 2010).  These tools help to address the transfer of illegally caught fish to 
pens and ranches in the Mediterranean Sea, which has been identified by ICCAT as 
critical to reducing IUU fishing and increasing the health of the eastern bluefin stock 
by ICCAT (ICCAT 2012a). This is partially due to the fact that at-sea transfers of 
bluefin do not count toward a country’s share of the TAC, only landed fish do. 
Further, illegal catch of undersized and immature tuna to supply the ranching pens 
significantly undermines ICCAT’s ability to forecast availability of mature, spawning 
fish necessary to support maximum sustainable yield of the fishery (ICCAT 2012a). 
  
     4.  Politics Surrounding Bluefin Tuna  
     A.  Political Pressure Affects Bluefin Tuna Management 
Bluefin is an emblematic example of a shared stock and this creates a tricky 
political context...the main challenge for the conservation and management of  
this stock is nowadays more political than scientific... (Fromentin and Fonteneau 
2002, pg. 74). 
 
 Each CPC has its own motivations for engaging in bluefin fisheries; this 
situation causes political tension between states that want to halt the decline of bluefin 
tuna worldwide and the states that catch, ranch, and sell tuna.  For example, recent 
high unemployment in countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece, renders little political 
support for enforcing rules that would keep boats and fishermen in port in these 
countries (Sumaila and Huang 2012).  These countries often pay large sums to 
developing states like Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt in order to catch portions of their 
allocated tuna quotas to keep their large fishing industries working during hard 
economic times (Sumaila and Huang 2012, European Commission on Fisheries 2012).   
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 Small-scale tuna fishers and operators of fish traps claim they wish to continue 
traditional fishing practices as part of a cultural identity (Roesti 1966, Maggio 2000).  
The complex interplay of these factors create pressure that impacts bluefin tuna stocks 
perhaps more than any other stock under ICCAT’s management.  According to one 
ICCAT scientist, “There was just no political will to enforce the rules” of setting 
reduced TACs in the face of these economic and cultural considerations in the late 
1990s to mid-2000s, which contributed to bluefin stock declines (ICIJ 2010, pg. 8). 
 
     B.  Bluefin Tuna as a Special Status Species 
 The large size, wide migrations, over-exploited status, charisma, popularity, 
economic importance, recognition, and high demand in the sushi industry have helped 
bluefin tuna achieve an elevated status (Doyle et al. 1995, Leader-Williams and 
Dublin 2000, Entwistle and Dunstone 2000, Sergio et al. 2008, ICCAT 2008, Martin-
Lopez et al. 2009, Collette 2011). Non-scientific information can play a crucial role in 
conservation initiatives and legal status of a species, as it has with bluefin tuna (Safina 
and Klinger 2001, Worm and Duffy 2003, Martin-Lopez et al. 2009). Conservation 
biology literature notes that listing a species as “threatened” or “endangered” of 
extinction in national or international arenas is linked with such “iconic” species that 
capture humans’ attention and imagination (Ray 2005, Sergio et al. 2008, Martin-
Lopez et al. 2009, Collette 2011). As a result of this elevated status, conservation 
groups now “pursue protective measures [for bluefin] with a zeal usually reserved for 
whales” (Porch 2005, pg. 364). This status, however, has important policy 
implications, both positive and negative (Weber 2002, Webster 2011). 
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 Bluefin tuna have become a powerful policy symbol of overfishing and the 
need for conservation over the past few decades as a result of their “iconic,” 
“charismatic” attributes.  Policy symbols can be used to unite and promote and effect 
change (Brunner 1987). They can help lead to issue expansion, whereby an issue takes 
on a more important, prominent role than it once had because different advocacy 
coalitions rally around it for a specific cause to try to garner support for their specific 
position (Brunner 1987, Yanow 1993, Harvey 1994).  In addition, symbols can help an 
issue such as overfishing obtain meaning by communicating the complex science 
involved with a simple image (Yanow 1993). They can also help create consensus on 
issues, such as “overfished” status of species or the need for conservation, and lead to 
rapid opinion formation on an issue (Brunner 1987). Finally, policy symbols can also 
be used to exploit, coerce, subvert, or de-emphasize the empirical or scientific 
understanding of a subject and overemphasize the social understanding of an issue 
depending on the perceptions of those involved in creating the symbol (Appleyard 
1979, Brunner 1987).  This can be especially problematic for an international symbol 
such as the bluefin tuna, because different cultural meanings from across the 
Convention Area can become attached to it (Yanow 1993).  
 In the context of the bluefin tuna management policy problem, the symbolism 
associated with bluefin tuna has changed considerably over time.  Ancient Phoenician 
and other Mediterranean cultures put bluefin tuna images on the opposite side of coins 
stamped with the epic hero Hercules to represent the power, bounty, and wonder of the 
sea (Maggio 2000).  Recently, environmental and NGO groups can use the symbol of 
the beleaguered bluefin tuna to argue for broader changes within ICCAT and fisheries 
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management in general. Groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, Oceana, 
Greenpeace International, Pew Environment Group, and others now use the image of 
bluefin tuna as a symbol of overexploitation of fisheries and marine resources more 
generally.  This strong symbolism has been used to evoke a sense of wonder and awe 
in people concerned about species conservation and effective fisheries management, 
which potentially attracts non-scientific explanations and information on the subject 
(Yanow 1993).  It helped fuel the recognition of the troubled plight of bluefin tuna in 
popular media over time, as well as recent pushes to ban trade on the species in the 
United States and internationally.  This will be discussed more in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER IV.  THESIS METHODOLOGY 
     1.  Literature Review Methodology to Test Six Hypotheses 
     A.  ICCAT Management Regime Comparison 
 In this Chapter, I describe the literature review and key informant interview 
methods used to analyze documents and extract insights from key informant interview 
transcripts to test the following hypotheses about the factors that contribute to the 
management of bluefin tuna: 
 1.  High market value of bluefin tuna meat does not fully account for the 
 unique  management of this species.  
 
 2.  Individual market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishing 
 industry are not greater in proportion to the special management attention this 
 species receives compared to other ICCAT-managed fisheries. 
 
 3.  Bluefin tuna have achieved an “iconic” or “charismatic” status in popular 
 media,  peer-reviewed literature, and in non-governmental group 
 publications that other ICCAT-managed stocks have not. 
 
 4.  This “iconic” status contributes to the management approaches adopted by 
 ICCAT to manage this species differently than others, and has important 
 implications for both the resource and the fishing industry. 
 
 5.  Non-scientific information and political pressure play a major role in 
 influencing which management tools are adopted at ICCAT meetings, and a 
 disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is afforded to 
 bluefin tuna. 
 
 6.  Media scrutiny and heightened status of the bluefin tuna affects ICCAT’s 
 ability to effectively manage the species.  
   
 To explore these hypotheses, I first compiled and compared the management 
measures used to regulate the bluefin tuna fishery to those of used to manage the 
ICCAT-managed fisheries for bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna.  These 
fisheries were utilized as useful comparison subjects because they represent the 
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bluefin’s closest peers in terms of value, size, and attributes of the fisheries. To do 
this, I reviewed ICCAT reports of management measures for each stock. This 
methodology is similar to Krippendorff’s qualitative content analysis, which he 
summarizes as a collection of methods of examining communication that yield 
inferences from verbal, illustrative, and symbolic information (Krippendorff 2013).  I 
used this methodology to draw insights and make explanatory comments about the 
discourse and messages communicated in literature to assess my six hypotheses. I 
focused on ICCAT published documents, NGO reports, and academic publications as 
the major sources for my literature review.  I compared quantitative data where 
appropriate, such as comparing relative numbers of management actions used for a 
specific fishery, but focused mainly on qualitative presentation of information. 
 
     B.  Comparing Relative Market Value of ICCAT-Managed Fisheries 
 To address my first two hypotheses, I needed to compile ICCAT data on the 
relative scale and fleet size in each fishery as well as market data. Since high prices 
are cited as a reason for different ICCAT management, I wanted to find out if bluefin 
tuna fishery was actually the most valuable one managed by ICCAT.  There are no 
comparative analyses of the market value of all ICCAT fisheries that are publicly 
available, so I had to piece together one of my own that was consistent.  To assess 
market value, I calculated and compared the estimated value of bluefin fisheries to 
those for bigeye and yellowfin tuna and swordfish, because those fisheries are most 
similar to the bluefin fishery in terms of size of fleets, methods, and areas where the 
fisheries are focused.  To estimate the relative market value of these fisheries within 
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the ICCAT Convention Area, I first summarized which methods of capture accounted 
for the majority of catch in each one based on ICCAT’s published summary reports.  
Then, I used ICCAT’s official Record of Vessels to compare number of vessels 
actively engaged in the fishery for each species to get an idea of the Convention-wide 
scale of each fishery.  This rough comparative tool is not meant to be precise, but is 
intended to illustrate relative economic importance of the fisheries for each species.   
 In order to complete a useful comparative analysis, I used the number of 
vessels involved in unique fisheries as a proxy for effort in the ICCAT Convention 
Area for the bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna fisheries. I took into account 
the fact that ICCAT only requires accurate accounting of vessels in the Mediterranean 
Sea, not throughout the rest of the Convention Area.  This skews the fishing effort data 
considerably for swordfish, bigeye tuna, and yellowfin tuna, whose fisheries are 
mostly prosecuted outside of the Mediterranean Sea and on the eastern side of the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Despite these limitations, this approach provides a reasonable 
estimate of size and effort involved in the fisheries because no other relevant data 
sources are accurately compiled or publicly available (Miyake and Kebe 1996). 
 These data on the number of vessels and CPCs actively involved in each 
fishery were gathered to complement market data from Madrid’s Fish Market, 
Mercamadrid, to estimate the total market value of each fishery to help address my 
research questions.  Actual market prices for ICCAT-managed species were obtained 
from this fish market because it is the second largest in the world and it lies at the 
center of the Convention Area.  Market data from Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish Market were 
not available for this assessment. I used market data for bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna, 
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swordfish, and yellowfin tuna to summarize the average price in U.S. dollars per 
kilogram of fish from the Convention Area, which I multiplied by the most current 
legal MSY or proxy (measured in metric tonnes) provided by ICCAT’s website to 
obtain an estimate of the total relative market value of each fishery.  In this estimate of 
relative value of ICCAT-managed fisheries, I assumed that all else but the market 
price and average size of these species is equal. 
  
     C. Assessing Effects of Bluefin Tuna’s Special Status on its Management 
 To assess the special status that bluefin tuna have attained and its impacts in 
hypotheses 3 and 4, I reviewed conservation biology literature and environmental 
NGO and conservation group publications, and created a tool with which to gauge 
bluefin tuna’s “iconic” and “charismatic” status.  I summarized conservation biology 
literature on charismatic megafauna and its impacts on conservation to compile a list 
of attributes that all such species have in common. Next, I examined the records of 
five influential journals in the field of fisheries conservation to get a sense of the body 
of published research on bluefin tuna compared to other ICCAT-managed stocks. I 
examined the records of the journals Science, Nature, Fisheries Research, Marine 
Policy, Ecology and Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment from 1964, or as long 
as the journals have been published, to present.  I chose five journals to act as a rough 
illustration of the publishing popularity of each species out of practical considerations.  
I could have examined the records of dozens of journals, but my intent here is merely 
illustrative.  I assessed their relative importance in terms of the number of times these 
journals have been cited in the documents I used for my literature review.   
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 Finally, I relied on a combination of literature review and interviews to assess 
hypotheses 5 and 6.  I extracted information from each to create a chronological 
narrative of the special status bluefin tuna have attained since the 1970s through the 
influence of interest groups.  I qualitatively assessed some of the relative pressure 
these groups have put on ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna through various domestic and 
international conservation vehicles such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act to gauge 
this assessment.  I also examined how non-scientific information has played into these 
efforts and affects how ICCAT adopts various management measures. 
  
     2.  Key Informant Semi-Structured Interview Methodology 
     A.  Background 
 I used a semi-structured interview methodology to test my hypotheses about 
why bluefin tuna are managed differently than other ICCAT-managed stocks that 
reflect current popular beliefs. Semi-structured, purposive interviews are not useful for 
generalizing about populations on a large scale, but are effective at offering general 
impressions and insights into a particular issue by offering flexibility with how 
questions are asked (Tremblay 1957, Bernard 2006, Dalton 2006). This methodology 
suits my purposes in this study, because this research requires qualitative information 
and targeted sampling of specialized knowledge that relatively few individuals hold.  
This methodology afforded me the flexibility to progressively re-structure questions to 
probe various aspects of a respondent’s specific topical knowledge (Bernard 2006).  
 I compared findings from the literature review to the themes that emerged in 
the interviews while keeping in mind that not all interviews would provide me with a 
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perfect sample of information.  Some key informants have more firsthand expertise 
about some topics than others, and even people with the same level of experience on 
an issue may have different perceptions of the same idea or experience (Bernard 
2006).  To address this, I sought to interview key informants from a pool of thirty 
people that are intimately familiar with Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna management 
and the ICCAT management process from a United States perspective.  I contacted 
fifteen experts (50% of the total pool) with a generic email explaining my intent to 
conduct semi-structured, confidential key informant interviews to assist me in my 
research as well as a formal, voluntary Consent to Participate Form explaining the 
research project in detail (See Appendices I and II). The respondents represent every 
interest group with representation on the U.S. ICCAT delegation.  I interviewed the 
twelve potential informants that responded, making my response rate 80% and 
securing a representative sample of 80% of the total pool.   
 
    B.  Choosing Key Informants 
 I chose to interview U.S.-based bluefin tuna experts that have attended at least 
one ICCAT General Meeting or Special Meeting in the last decade. I reached out to 
interview only U.S. bluefin tuna management experts out of expediency.  Since 
ICCAT is the largest RFMO, there are hundreds of individuals representing over fifty 
countries with a working knowledge of their management, but language barriers and 
practical considerations prevented me from contacting them for this research. The next 
logical step in making this study more representative of perspectives of other ICCAT 
members would have been to interview experts from Japan and the EU, the other two 
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most influential bluefin tuna fishing nations.  However, language barriers and practical 
concerns made taking this next step difficult and unviable for this thesis research.  
 The respondents I interviewed serve as a useful representation of the many 
different groups and interests involved in ICCAT meetings from a U.S. perspective, 
but perhaps not ICCAT as a whole. I chose these participants from lists of U.S. 
ICCAT delegations to the ICCAT Annual Meetings from the U.S. National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS 2012).  In this regard, my interview methods are 
representative in that I interviewed a representative of every major interest group 
listed that takes part in ICCAT meetings as part of the official U.S. delegation 
(Bernard 2006).  The U.S. delegation is one of the most influential at ICCAT 
meetings, and their scientists and NGO representatives help provide the science that 
drives management decisions on bluefin tuna (Weber 2002, Ruais 2012).  Therefore, it 
is valuable to sample U.S.-based experts as I have here. 
  
     C.  Conducting Key Informant Interviews, Compiling Results 
 After initial emails were sent to potential key informants, I began interviewing 
twelve respondents that had read, signed, and returned the Consent to Participate Form 
that took place between November and December 2012.  During phone interviews that 
each lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour and fifteen minutes, I asked 
respondents a prepared list of seven questions and additional questions about their 
years of experience in bluefin tuna management issues and any specialized fisheries 
expertise they may have (See Appendix III).  
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 I transcribed the interview responses by hand, and typed them immediately 
after each interview had been completed.  I created a spreadsheet to compile and 
organize interview responses. Rather than use direct quotations from key informants 
that might betray their identities in this confidential study, I grouped similar responses 
together based on keywords and overarching themes.  I split up responses to each 
question by respondent, and looked for common themes or general trends.  I organized 
transcripts from each interview and developed a structured coding scheme to identify 
themes of contributing factors of bluefin management (Bernard 2006).  The coding 
scheme was grounded in either ICCAT management tools or emerging themes from 
the literature review using grounded theory interpretation techniques (Bernard 2006, 
Matchar et al. 2006).   
 For questions referring to specific management tools or approaches, I grouped 
responses according to tools identified in ICCAT documents.  For questions referring 
to perceptions or impacts of these tools, I used my own value judgments based on my 
literature review to group them into impact themes.  I used keywords to group these 
responses, which is admittedly an imperfect and non-subjective component of my 
coding methods.  However, a reasonable person that had conducted a literature review 
would be led to similar coding choices, making my methods and results realistically 
repeatable. Then, I aggregated general impressions from the notes and compared them 
to the responses of the group as a whole in a qualitative manner. Since the sample size 
was relatively small for this study (n = 12), I avoided percentage breakdowns of 
frequency of responses.  I summarized how many participants responded a certain way 
to each question, and present these results in Chapter V.  
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     D.  Comparing Respondents’ Input with Literature Review 
 I compared the literature review findings with respondents’ insights to 
determine if my hypotheses were supported or rejected.  The usefulness of these 
exercises lies in the insight they provide into the complexities and difficulties of 
managing Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna within the ICCAT-management framework 
while dispelling common misperceptions about bluefin tuna management. This is 
particularly valuable for those generally interested in fisheries management. 
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CHAPTER V.  RESULTS 
     1.  Hypothesis Testing  
     A.  Hypotheses 1, 2:  Market Value, Fleet Size, and Scale of Bluefin Fishery 
 In this chapter, I provide an overview of the results of content analysis and 
interview responses in the same order as my hypotheses are listed.  Hypothesis 1 
questions whether the high market value of bluefin tuna meat fully accounts for the 
unique management of bluefin tuna.  Similarly, Hypothesis 2 posits that both the 
individual market value of individual fish, fleet size, and scale of the fishery for 
bluefin across the ICCAT Convention Area are not greater in proportion to the special 
management attention this species receives.  
 To assess the relative market value and create a proxy for the relative scale of 
the bluefin tuna fishery, I summarized the number of vessels officially registered with 
ICCAT to pursue bigeye tuna, bluefin tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna in the 
Convention Area (ICCAT 2011b, See Table 10). 
 
Table 11. Summary of registered numbers of vessels in four ICCAT fisheries. 
ICCAT-Managed Species Registered Number of Vessels in Fishery 
Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna  1,277** 
Bluefin Tuna 1,012* 
Swordfish 12,600** 
ICCAT 2011d. Note:  These numbers represent catching-vessels only. * Denotes a 
fishery where the reported vessels account for a majority of catch of that species.  
** Denotes a fishery where the reported vessels do not account for a majority of catch 
of that species; the fishery is mostly prosecuted elsewhere in the Convention Area. 
  
 For this comparison, I ignored the numbers of processing and transport ships 
involved in these fisheries for this comparison, because these vessels are often 
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engaged in multiple fisheries (ICCAT 2011d). Also, the majority of the fishery for 
bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tunas is prosecuted outside the Mediterranean 
Sea, which contrasts with the fishery for bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2011d). I provide 
evidence here that market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishery is not 
greater than those of fisheries for other ICCAT-managed species, and is not currently 
in proportion to the magnitude of management attention it receives.  
 Estimating total value of these fisheries is complicated by considerable 
multiplier effects of economic factors such as labor, travel, lodging, bait, ice, gear, and 
other costs that are highly variable, diverse, and largely unreported among the various 
fleets for these four species (ICIJ 2010). I avoid complex economic analysis of these 
forces and instead compiled June 2012 average price data (in U.S. Dollars per 
kilogram) of various ICCAT species below to illustrate market value of these fisheries 
(FIS 2012, VASEP 2012). I chose to use June data because this was the most recent 
data available at the time, and I wanted to reflect the relatively high seasonal prices of 
bluefin tuna that are paid in the summer months (Issenberg 2007, See Table 11). 
 
Table 12. Average actual market prices of ICCAT-managed species, in $US/kg, from 
Mercamadrid, Spain, in June 2012.  
ICCAT Species, Market Product Average Price ($US/kg) 
Bullet/Frigate Tuna, Whole $2.10 – 2.75 
Swordfish, Gutted Whole $14.42 - 18.92 
Yellowfin Tuna, Whole $4.81 - 6.32 
Albacore Tuna, Whole $6.61 – 8.68 
Bigeye Tuna, Whole* $8.46 – 9.36 
Bluefin, Gutted, Head Off* $11.82 – 16.58 
Data from FIS 2012. *Bigeye and bluefin tuna price data were originally recorded in 
Japanese Yen in reports on their market value and then converted using June 2012 
exchange rates of for the Japanese Yen to the U.S. Dollar. 
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 From this compiled data, gutted and beheaded bluefin tuna were more valuable 
than any other tuna species, but were about 20% less valuable than whole gutted 
swordfish in the summer of 2012 (FIS 2012). This simple market analysis represents 
only a snapshot in time of the very complex tuna trading industry, but nonetheless 
supports Hypothesis 1 and provides further evidence to support Hypothesis 2.  The 
available average market prices paid for each ICCAT species is compiled along with 
each species’ ICCAT-mandated MSY or proxy in metric tonnes (See Table 12). 
 
Table 13.  ICCAT MSY for stocks of bigeye tuna, bluefin tuna, swordfish, and 
yellowfin tuna and actual June 2012 average price in US Dollars per kilogram. 
Species 
 
MSY or Proxy of Stock in metric 
tonnes 
Reported Market Value in 
US Dollars per kilogram 
Bigeye 
Tuna 
78,000 – 102,000 $8.46 – 9.36 
Bluefin 
Tuna 
Western – 2,500 
Eastern/Mediterranean – 13,500 
$11.82 – 16.58 
 
Swordfish 
Northern - 13,000 – 14,000 
Southern – 15,000 
Mediterranean – 14,600 
$14.42 - 18.92 
Yellowfin 
Tuna 
115,000 – 145,000 $4.81 - 6.32 
Data from ICCAT 2012a, FIS 2012. 
 
 I then multiplied the total ICCAT-set MSY of each fishery by its respective 
market price to compare the relative market value of each fishery.  To ensure 
consistency in this analysis, I applied the highest reported market price to the highest 
MSY value or proxy for each stock. My calculations of the rough market value for the 
fisheries for these four species follow in alphabetical order: 
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 1.  Bigeye Tuna:  102,000 total mt x 1000kg = 102,000,000kg  
 $9.36/kg:  102,000,000 x $9.36 =  $954,000,000 
 
 2.  Bluefin Tuna:  16,000 total mt x 1000kg = 16,000,000kg  
 $16.58/kg:  16,000,000 x $16.58 =  $265,280,000 
 
 3.  Swordfish:  43,600 total mt x 1000kg =  43,600,000kg 
 $18.92/kg:  43,600,000 x $18.92 =  $824,912,000 
 
 4.  Yellowfin Tuna:  145,000 total mt x 1000kg =  145,000,000kg  
 $6.32/kg:  145,000,000 x $6.32 =  $916,400,000 
  
 In summary, the value of the bluefin tuna fishery seems to be lowest of the 
four fisheries compared across the Convention Area (See Table 13). 
  
Table 14. Ranked summary of estimates of total market value of four ICCAT-
managed fisheries. 
ICCAT-Managed Fishery Estimated Total Market Value of Fishery Ranking 
Bigeye Tuna 1.  $954,000,000 
Yellowfin Tuna 2.  $916,400,000 
Swordfish 3.  $824,912,000 
Bluefin Tuna 4.  $265,280,000 
 
 These data contrast sharply with the common misperception that bluefin tuna 
represent the most valuable fishery in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.  This 
MSY-based comparison is imperfect due to inflated catches of species that exceed 
MSY, and has the potential to underestimate the total value of the fisheries by not 
including multiplier effects and seasonality differences in prices paid for each fish.  
However, this analysis is meant to be illustrative, and I have estimated the value of the 
bluefin tuna fishery is many times lower than the others.  My analysis is further 
supported by an independent consulting firm’s estimate of the approximately US$300 
million dollar value of the bluefin tuna fishery, which is reasonably close to my 
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estimate (Bonini et al. 2011, pg. 16.).  In addition, bluefin tuna catch constitutes less 
than 5% of total tuna catch in the Convention Area.  In light of its small contribution 
to total tuna catch, it seems that bluefin tuna attract disproportionate magnitude of 
ICCAT management and media attention.  This analysis supports Hypothesis 2. 
 
     B.  Hypotheses 3, 4: “Iconic” Status of Bluefin Tuna 
 I assert that bluefin tuna have been made popular in part through media 
attention in the forms of television specials, movies, newspaper articles, and social 
media campaigns.  Popular television shows and documentaries such as “Fighting 
Tuna,” “Wicked Tuna,” and “Tuna Wranglers” focus on catching and ranching bluefin 
tuna. The British Broadcasting Corporation and National Geographic Society each 
produced educational specials about bluefin, including “Blue Planet-Open Ocean” and 
“Superfish: Bluefin Tuna” (National Geographic Society 2012).  These media 
productions focus on the over exploitation of many of the world’s fisheries, and 
highlight the perceived “endangered” status of bluefin tuna, as in Charles Clover’s The 
End of the Line (Clover 2008).  
 This “iconic” status makes bluefin tuna a powerful policy symbol that has the 
effect helping to draw attention to an issue by groups of actors and advocacy 
coalitions such as environmental and conservation NGOs (Harvey 1994).  This 
symbolism is powerful, as noted in the policy literature, because it helps to bring 
issues such as the overfished state of both stocks of bluefin tuna, that are distant or 
poorly-understood, into people’s homes (Appleyard 1979).  When the plight of bluefin 
tuna is brought into people’s homes through ads and conservation campaign media, 
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social meanings about overfishing problems and the need to conserver ecosystems 
tend to take the place of a focus on scientific information and meanings based on 
research (Appleyard 1979, Harvey 1994). However, at the same time bluefin’s 
symbolic power in the policy realm is on the rise, they have also captured the attention 
of researchers more than other ICCAT species (See Tables 14 and 15). 
 
Table 15.  Results of peer-reviewed, published literature search queries for “Northern 
Bluefin Tuna”. 
Peer-Reviewed Journal 
Records Reviewed 
Years 
Covered 
Number of Articles with “Northern 
Bluefin Tuna” in Title, Abstract 
Nature 1973 - Present 10 
Science 1974 - Present 60 
Fisheries Research 1986 - Present 180 
Marine Policy 1986 - Present 50 
Ecology and Frontiers in 
Ecology and the 
Environment 
1998 - Present 30 
 TOTAL 330 
 
Table 16. Combined results of peer-reviewed, published literature database search 
queries for “Bigeye Tuna” and “Yellowfin Tuna”. 
Peer-Reviewed 
Journal Records 
Reviewed 
Years Covered Number of Articles with “Yellowfin 
Tuna” or “Bigeye Tuna” in Title, 
Abstract 
Nature 1964 - Present 3 + 3 
Science 1968 - Present 2 + 1 
Fisheries Research 1976 - Present 90 + 25 
Marine Policy 1986 - Present 18 + 16 
Ecology and Frontiers 
in Ecology and the 
Environment 
1997 - Present 12 + 4 
 TOTAL 165 
 
 Articles about bluefin tuna are published 30% more frequently than works 
about other ICCAT species. This provides support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
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 Research popularity and powerful symbolism have helped bluefin tuna attain 
and perpetuate an “iconic” and “charismatic” status (Doyle et al. 1995, Sissenwine et 
al. 1998, Safina 1998, Worm and Duffy 2003, Mace 2004, Sergio et al. 2008, Martin-
Lopez 2009, Collette 2011, Wolinsky 2012, See Table 16). ICCAT referenced this 
special status of the species in their independent performance review, which was 
driven by cries in the international community for a “hard look” at their effectiveness: 
Civil society has taken stronger interest in management, especially for  
iconic [bluefin] tuna species (ICCAT 2008 pg. 4). 
 
 
Table 17.  Characteristics of “charismatic,” “iconic” species and bluefin tuna compiled 
from conservation biology and fisheries management literature (Doyle et al. 1995, 
Sissenwine et al. 1998, Safina 1998, Worm and Duffy 2003, Mace 2004, Sergio et al. 
2008, Martin-Lopez 2009, Collette 2011, Wolinsky 2012). 
Attributes of 
“Charismatic” 
or “Iconic” 
Species 
 
 
Corresponding Attributes of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
Large Size Largest bony fishes in the ocean. 
 
Rare 
More rare than any other tuna species, and perhaps more than any 
other commercially harvested species 
 
 
Popular 
Found in every ocean in the world and migrate great distances; 
interact with humans commonly.  Fisheries for bluefin are the 
oldest recorded in the world.  Demand for their flesh largely drives 
expansion of the world’s sushi industries.  There are numerous 
documentaries and popular television shows about bluefin tuna. 
Ability to 
Capture 
Public 
Imagination 
Bluefin tuna are highly regarded as game, sport, and table-fish 
around the world, and are one of the fastest fishes in the sea. They 
are utilized by environmental NGOs as “flagship” species to 
attract public attention to conservation campaigns. 
High 
Economic 
Importance 
 
No fish sells for a higher price at market than bluefin tuna. 
 “Threatened”  
or 
“Endangered” 
Status 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
has listed all three bluefin tuna species around the world as 
“Endangered” on their “Redlist”.  Several attempts to list bluefin 
under CITES have also been made.  Both stocks of bluefin tuna in 
the Convention Area are currently overfished. 
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 Based on these attributes, bluefin tuna meet and surpass the requirements of an 
“iconic” species.  They display all of the characteristics necessary to have attained this 
status, and have the added benefit of a long, storied history of use as a powerful 
symbol since at least 4,000 B.C., as evidenced by cave paintings with their image from 
Sicily (Maggio 2000).  This summary of literature supports Hypothesis 3. 
 
     C.  Hypothesis 4:  “Iconic” Status Contributes to ICCAT Management 
 A literature review provided little support for this hypothesis. The only 
published evidence that supports this idea comes from the American Bluefin Tuna 
Association and is anecdotal (Ruais 2011). I revisit this hypothesis in Chapter VI. 
 
     D.  Hypothesis 5:  Political Pressure Affects ICCAT Management  
 According to Hypothesis 5, non-scientific information and political pressure 
from interest groups play a major role in influencing adoption of management tools at 
ICCAT meetings, and a disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is 
afforded to bluefin tuna.  Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) do put pressure 
on ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna, as evidenced by various attempts to forbid trade of 
the species internationally by many countries (ICCAT 2008, See Table 17). No such 
attempts at legal protection have been made for other ICCAT species. 
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Table 18. Summary table of attempts to secure legal protection for bluefin tuna. 
Year Type of Legal Protection Sought Major Responsible Party  
1974 “Endangered” status under Sec. 4 of the 
U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
Sport Fishing Institute (SFI)  
1992 Appendix 1 CITES listing National Audubon Society; 
Government of Sweden 
1994 Appendix 1 CITES listing Greenpeace International; 
Government of Kenya 
2010 Appendix CITES listing Prince of Monaco 
2010 “Threatened” or “Endangered” status 
under Sec. 4 of the U.S. ESA 
Center for Biological Diversity 
2011 “Endangered” status under Canada’s 
legal structure 
Committee on the Status of 
Endangered Wildlife in Canada 
(COSEWIC) 
      
E.  Hypothesis 6:  Status Affects ICCAT’s Management of Bluefin Tuna 
 According to Hypothesis 6, media scrutiny and heightened status of the bluefin 
tuna affects the ability of ICCAT to effectively manage the species at MSY levels. The 
efforts of conservation groups and environmental NGOs, coupled with intense media 
attention on ICCAT in the mid-2000s, drove ICCAT to order an independent review 
of the effectiveness of its organization (ICCAT 2008).  The independent review 
concluded that ICCAT’s handling of bluefin tuna management, on which the public 
judges the effectiveness of the whole organization, amounted to an “international 
disgrace” because they consistently set higher TACs than were recommended by their 
own SCRS experts (ICCAT 2008, pg. 19). This disgrace impacted how ICCAT made 
quota allocation decisions and set TAC levels, and provides some evidence to support 
the idea that the strong policy symbol that the bluefin tuna has become impacts its own 
management in complex ways.   
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 Specifically, there appears to be a link between attempts to list the bluefin tuna 
under CITES and the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the setting of TACs in line 
with scientific recommendations for the first time in decades. Some respondents and 
the ICCAT Independent Performance Review in 2008 suggest that these two specific 
efforts to secure legal protection for the fish were taken extremely seriously by ICCAT 
for fear that they would lose their management mandate over the species forever 
(ICCAT 2008). This symbolic power of the bluefin tuna helped create one of the small 
successes in its management. As a result of the strong amount of scientific and non-
scientific information fueled by environmental NGOs and other advocacy coalitions 
pushing of the symbol of the overfished bluefin tuna, ICCAT began to lower TACs 
substantially starting in the 2011-fishing year (ICCAT 2012c). This started a 
decreasing trend in SCRS recommendations for TACs and the actual quotas set in a 
given year (See Table 18). TACs and recovery plans based on them were identified in 
Chapter I as the two bright spots in bluefin tuna management, and there is evidence 
from the public policy literature that the use of the symbol of bluefin tuna and its 
“iconic,” elevated status helped to create the momentum for this change. Importantly, 
there is a lag time of a few years to ratchet TACs down in to scientifically based 
levels, but this is due to the fact that TACs are set every other year for two years, so 
are not adjusted at every annual meeting (ICCAT 2012a).  
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Table 19.  ICCAT SCRS TAC recommendation and TAC set for eastern 
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea bluefin tuna by year. 
Year SCRS TAC Recommendation (mt) Quota Set by ICCAT (mt) 
2003 15,000 32,000 
2004 15,000 32,000 
2005 15,000 32,000 
2006 15,000 32,000 
2007 15,000 29,500 
2008 15,000 28,500 
2009 8,500 - 15,000 22,000 
2010 8,000 19,950 
2011 8,000 13,500 
2012 8,000 - 15,000 12,900 
2013 8,000 - 15,000 13,500 
Modified and updated from Sumaila and Huang 2012. Table 5, pg. 507. 
 
 The second failed CITES listing attempt in 2010 led directly to 
Recommendation 11-17 which emphasized ICCAT’s commitment to seeking out the 
best available science on which to make its decisions, Recommendation 11-18 which 
improves the use of trade sanctions and their effectiveness for flag states of vessels 
involved in IUU fishing, and Recommendation 11-20 which strengthened the existing 
bluefin catch documentation scheme to close catch reporting loopholes (ICCAT 
2011c). Pressure from environmental groups also drove development of the eBCD 
scheme (ICCAT 2011c).  There is evidence that these measures were partially driven 
by the special status of the species and public and NGO attention on bluefin tuna 
management from the interviews, which will be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
 The special status of bluefin tuna influenced proposals to list Northern the 
species under Section 4(a) 1 of the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973 and 
Appendix 1 of CITES (Ruais 2011).  These attempts failed to secure legal protection 
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of bluefin tuna from directed fishing effort and international trade, but did succeed in 
heightening public interest in the species.  Interest group campaigns over the last four 
decades have played a role in the politicization of the science presented at ICCAT 
meetings that inform management decisions (Whynott 1995, Porch 2005, Ruais 2011).  
For example, scientific advice was largely ignored in setting TACs in the Eastern 
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea until several proposals for an Appendix 1 CITES listing 
were made, partially due to the intense public attention on the subject (ICCAT 2008). 
 Finally, the poor state of the fisheries for bluefin tuna in the Western and 
Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea had a lasting effect on the focus on management 
of bluefin tuna that has not been consistent with the amount of attention paid to other 
ICCAT-managed stocks (ICCAT 2008, Webster 2011).  For decades, the main focus 
of ICCAT has been on the bluefin tuna at the expense of yellowfin and bigeye 
management, further research, and increasing compliance with mandatory ICCAT 
Recommendations.  Though bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna, and swordfish stocks are 
much larger and more valuable than bluefin tuna stocks in the Convention Area, 
proactive management of these species has taken a backseat to bluefin tuna priorities 
(Webster 2011). These data provide evidence that supports Hypotheses 5 and 6. 
 
     2.  Respondent Interview Results 
     A.  The Respondents 
 Of the twelve interview respondents, five were female and seven were male. 
The respondents had a minimum of two years and a maximum of twenty-two years of 
experience in bluefin tuna management issues.  The mean of the years of experience 
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data per respondent was 14.25, and the mode of the data was fifteen years.  Only three 
of the twelve respondents had less than ten years of experience working on bluefin 
tuna management issues, suggesting that the respondents had a sufficient amount of 
expertise on the topic.  One of the twelve key respondents had not personally taken 
part in an ICCAT meeting, but had an in-depth knowledge of the tuna ranching 
industry and management tools that made that respondent’s unique insight particularly 
valuable.  The respondents represent nine different interest groups from academia, 
government agencies, fishing industry experts and bluefin tuna fishers and embody a 
representative knowledge of bluefin tuna management from a U.S. perspective. 
 
     B.  Fishery Management Tools Employed in Bluefin Tuna Fishery 
 First, respondents were asked to identify the current tools used by ICCAT to 
manage the both stocks of bluefin tuna. Eleven respondents mentioned thirty-seven 
tools, which were grouped into nine categories based on ICCAT lists (See Table 19).  
 
Table 20.  Summary of the management tool categories used by ICCAT to manage 
stocks of bluefin tuna as identified by respondents in order of response frequency. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Note:  The number in parentheses in this chapter represents the number of respondents 
who gave that specific response. Each participant provided more than one response. 
• TACs  (7) 
• Time/area closures  (5) 
• East/west management boundary  (5) 
• Minimum size limits  (5) 
• Gear restrictions  (4) 
• Catch documentation programs  (4) 
• Limited effort programs  (3) 
• Recovery plans  (3) 
• MSY reference points  (1) 	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C.  Factors Leading to Adoption of These Tools 
 Respondents were then asked to identify factors that led to adoption of the 
specific tools. Forty-six factors were identified by eleven respondents, which were 
grouped into sixteen categories. The mode of the data was four (See Table 20). 
 
Table 21. Factors identified by respondents as important to ICCAT adoption of 
management tools for the bluefin tuna fishery in order of response frequency. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.  Management Tools Not Effectively Used in Bluefin Fishery 
 Third, respondents were asked what management tools have not yet been 
effectively employed by ICCAT in the bluefin tuna fishery to identify possible 
alternative management tools. Ten respondents identified twenty-two new potential 
management tools. These tools were grouped into ten categories. The mode of the 
number of tools noted by respondents was two (See Table 21). 
 
 
• East/west management boundary  (6) 
• Complexity of fishery  (5) 
• History of fishery  (4) 
• Political pressure put on ICCAT  (4) 
• Unique biology of the species  (4) 
• CITES listing proposal threat  (3) 
• Different management capacities of CPCs  (3) 
• Insufficient catch reporting  (3) 
• Bluefin tuna ranching and aquaculture  (3) 
• Market value of species  (2) 
• ICCAT independent performance review  (2) 
• Organization of ICCAT  (2) 
• Scientific uncertainty  (2) 
• Threat of fishery closure  (1) 
• TAC allocation change  (1) 
• Broad media attention  (1) 	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Table 22. Management tools not effectively used to manage bluefin tuna according to 
respondents in order of response frequency. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.  Iconic Status of Bluefin and Implications for Management 
 Fourth, respondents were asked if bluefin tuna were an “iconic” or 
“charismatic” species.  One respondent thought that bluefin tuna should not be labeled 
as an “iconic” species, but as “charismatic” instead.  Respondents were also asked to 
identify the impacts of this “iconic” or “charismatic” status on the management of 
bluefin tuna. Twelve respondents identified forty-eight different impacts, which were 
grouped into nine categories.  The mode of the data was eight (See Table 22).  
 
Table 23. Impacts and attributes of “iconic” or “charismatic” status of bluefin tuna on 
their management as noted by respondents in order of response frequency. 
 
 
 
      
 
 
• Time/area closures  (4) 
• Protecting spawning aggregation hotspots  (3) 
• Complete fishery closure  (3) 
• Target and limit reference points for fishing mortality  (2) 
• Dismiss CPCs from ICCAT for noncompliance  (2) 
• Rescind bluefin quota from CPCs  (2) 
• Fishery-wide limited access scenarios  (2) 
• Improve catch reporting requirements  (2) 
• Gear changes  (1) 
• Increased peer review of scientific information  (1) 	  
• Shaped public perception of bluefin tuna  (9) 
• Increased media attention  (8) 
• Became an important factor for bluefin tuna management  (8) 
• Led to more effective management of bluefin tuna  (6) 
• Increased focus on scientific information  (5) 
• Complicates bluefin tuna management  (4) 
• Helped grow conservation group membership  (4) 
• Not as important as market value of scale of fishery  (3) 
• Only important factor in developed countries  (1) 
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F.  Impacts of Iconic Status of Bluefin on Resource, Industry  
 Respondents were asked about the impacts of the “iconic” or “charismatic” 
status on both the bluefin resource and the fishing industry.  Eleven respondents 
suggested forty-six impacts that were grouped into ten impact themes.  The mode of 
the number of impacts mentioned was three (See Table 23).  
 
Table 24. Impact themes of “iconic” or “charismatic” status of bluefin tuna on the 
resource and fishing industry in order of response frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     G.  Future Priorities for ICCAT 
 Finally, experts were asked what ICCAT should prioritize in order to sustain 
healthy populations of bluefin tuna in the short-term (less than five years).  Eleven 
respondents noted twenty-six priorities for ICCAT, which were grouped into seven 
subject themes based on similarities.  The mode of the number of priority themes 
noted was three.  Ten out of eleven respondents suggested that ICCAT prioritize 
funding for scientific research programs such as tagging fish, researching bluefin tuna 
life history such as mixing levels and data gathering projects (See Figure 12). The 
results of all interviews are summarized in tabular form (See Table 24). 
• ICCAT focuses on bluefin tuna at expense of other stocks  (7) 
• Positive impact for the stock status of the species  (7) 
• Created pressure for CITES listing proposal  (7) 
• Affected prices/markets for bluefin tuna meat  (6) 
• Created pressure to heed scientific advice of SCRS  (5) 
• Introduced inter-country TAC allocation issues  (3) 
• Led to catch documentation tool scheme changes  (3) 
• Negatively impacted bluefin tuna fishing industry  (3) 
• Introduced intra-country TAC allocation issues  (2) 
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Figure 12. Respondents’ opinions on what ICCAT should prioritize to maintain 
healthy stocks of bluefin tuna over the next five years. 
  
 
Table 25. Quantitative summary table of respondents’ responses showing highest 
levels of agreement on specific concepts. 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mentioning Concept / 
Total Respondents 
 
Concepts 
4 / 11 Time/Area closures have not yet been effectively utilized 
6 / 12 High market value of species is an important factor 
leading to the different management of bluefin tuna 
7 / 11 “Iconic” status focused public attention for Appendix 1 
CITES listings, had overall positive impact on the species 
but at the expense of management of other ICCAT-
species 
7 / 11 National shares of TACs are an important bluefin tuna 
management tool  
9 / 12 “Iconic” status shaped public perception of the species 
10 / 11 Scientific research should be an ICCAT priority to ensure 
stocks of bluefin tuna remain healthy in the short-term 
11 / 12 Bluefin tuna are an “iconic” species 
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CHAPTER VI.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This discussion aims to dispel misconceptions about the nature of bluefin tuna 
management in the ICCAT Convention Area by shedding light on common themes 
from my literature review and key informant interview responses.  I first examine the 
contributing factors that led to the adoption of specific management tools in the 
bluefin tuna fishery.  Then, I summarize various levels of agreement of experts from 
different interest groups to point to specific factors that drive bluefin’s unique 
management, such as importance of the history of the fishery and the two-stock 
hypothesis.  Based on these findings, I provide management recommendations for 
ICCAT to encourage effective management of bluefin tuna in the next five years.   
  
     1.  Discussion of Literature Review Results 
     A.  Bluefin Tuna Fishery is Not Most Valuable under ICCAT 
 I estimated that the bluefin tuna fishery was actually the lowest-value fishery 
compared to the fisheries for bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna.  When media 
outlets cite very high prices paid for a single bluefin tuna, they often erroneously or 
carelessly assume that this is the market price for all bluefin tuna (Whynott 1995, 
Mather et al. 1995, Ruais 2012). While the market value comparison presented in this 
research does not attempt to provide an exact estimation of fishery value, it provides a 
useful comparative tool that is reasonably close to a published economics firm 
estimate (Bonini et al. 2011). Market factors such as seasonality of prices, changes in 
prices of substitute and complimentary goods, and myriad multiplier effects such as 
costs of highly-industrial longline and purse seine fleets could be taken into account in 
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a more rigorous and complex market value analysis, but they are beyond the scope of 
this project. Also, my analysis does not take IUU fishing into account, which would 
likely skew the catch of all species far above MSY for each stock (ICCAT 2012c).  
 However, the illustrative nature of my analysis is enough to provide evidence 
that bluefin’s market value does not vastly overshadow those of other fishes as is 
commonly noted.  My comparison is somewhat corroborated by the respondents. 
Several respondents noted that the ICCAT-managed yellowfin tuna fishery is the most 
valuable in the Atlantic Ocean; this assertion is plausible in light of my comparison.  
 
     B.  Bluefin Tuna are a Popular, Special Status Species 
 As noted in Chapter V, a search engine query of “bluefin tuna” in five 
influential, peer reviewed scientific journals in the fisheries management field reveal 
that bluefin tuna are the most popular species for publication of all ICCAT-managed 
stocks in terms of the frequency with which they are the topic of the research 
publication in five influential journals.  Whether or not this translates into the idea that 
bluefin are the source of more research than both bigeye and yellowfin tuna combined 
is a different issue.  The point here is that for some reason, research with bluefin tuna 
as its subject is undertaken and gets published more frequently than research with 
other ICCAT-managed stocks (bigeye and yellowfin tuna) as its subject. Eleven of 
twelve respondents agreed with the literature that state that bluefin tuna are in fact a 
“charismatic,” “iconic” species that embody cultural or societal values, has physical 
attributes such as large size, great speed, perceived intelligence, or exceeding rarity 
that help humans identify with them. 
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     C.  Special Status of Bluefin Tuna Affects its Management 
 Many NGO conservation groups with offices in the United States such as 
Greenpeace International, Oceana, Pew Environment Group, World Wildlife Fund, 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the Center for Biological 
Diversity, and the National Geographic Society all have specific bluefin tuna 
conservation campaigns that solicit donations from members and non-members to 
bolster Atlantic bluefin tuna populations through advocacy campaigns to reduce the 
TACs for them (Oceana 2005, World Wildlife Fund 2012, Pew Environment Group 
2009, National Geographic Society 2012, International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature 2012). These groups were involved in both failed CITES listing proposals, as 
well as numerous attempts to get Atlantic bluefin tuna protected domestically via the 
Endangered Species Act (Whynott 1995, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Ruais 2011). These 
campaigns have had an effect on bluefin tuna management over time (ICCAT 2008, 
Ruais 2011). This added pressure from environmental groups put the management 
focus of ICCAT squarely on bluefin tuna while increasing media attention and public 
scrutiny (Weber 2002).  It also fundamentally changed the public’s perception of a 
fish that was once hardly considered cat food to the “iconic” and “charismatic” one it 
is today.  The ABTA sums up the effects of these conservation campaigns: 
 As a result of these relentless campaigns, the “magnificent” bluefin tuna  
 has evolved into the “charismatic” giant bluefin and now into the ‘iconic’  
 giant bluefin (Ruais 2011. pg. 2). 
 
   While there have been six attempts by many different countries worldwide 
since 1975 to legally protect ICCAT-managed bluefin tuna with “threatened” or 
“endangered” listings, there have been zero attempts made to legally protect other 
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ICCAT-managed commercial species during the same amount of time. The architects 
of these proposals were mostly coalitions of environmental non-profit groups and 
some recreational fishing interests, which banded together to put political pressure on 
ICCAT Commissioners and decision makers through media, advocacy campaigns, 
fundraising, and direct lobbying (Whynott 1995, Porch 2005, Ruais 2011). The 
“iconic” status of bluefin tuna helps drive its unique management by shaping public 
perception, providing ammunition for interest groups to pressure ICCAT 
Commissioners, and by affecting adoption of management recommendations.  
 
     D.  Summary 
 All but Hypothesis 4 listed in Chapter I are supported to varying degrees by 
literature review of peer-reviewed scientific literature, ICCAT official reports, 
publications from environmental NGOs and conservation groups, real market prices, 
industry group insights, and other documents.  Actual market data, ICCAT official 
reports, records of vessels, and literature from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) partially support Hypotheses 1 and 2 that the high market 
value of bluefin tuna does not fully-account for the special attention and unique 
management of the species.  In addition, the relative value of the bluefin fishery itself 
is not the greatest among ICCAT-managed stocks, nor is the value of the fishery 
proportional to the special management attention it receives from ICCAT. Analyses of 
these sources provide evidence to support Hypothesis 3 and partially support 
Hypothesis 4. Bluefin have attained an “iconic” and “charismatic” status and that this 
status contributes to ICCAT managing bluefin tuna differently than other species.  
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Further, these sources suggest that non-scientific information and political pressure 
play an important role in bluefin tuna management, and that this role is perhaps larger 
for this species than for any other. In addition, ICCAT reports provide affirmative 
support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, that suggest that non-scientific information and the 
heightened status of the species affect ICCAT’s management of bluefin tuna. 
 
     2.  Discussion of Key Informant Interview Results 
     A.  Concordance of Literature Review and Respondent Insights 
 The point that bluefin tuna are the only “iconic” status species managed by 
ICCAT is central to the argument made in this thesis:  this special status directly and 
indirectly influences the management of the species.  All but one respondent noted 
that the elevated status of the species is deserved, but that it pressures ICCAT to not 
afford proportional management attention to other stocks based on scientific or 
empirical information, such as relative market value, fleet size, or scale of fisheries.  If 
other species were to have an elevated status, perhaps they would be managed 
differently or more intensely and with more creative management measures than other 
more valuable or larger-scale ICCAT fisheries. 
 The weight of this “iconic” status seems to be quite large and has important 
implications for bluefin tuna management. One respondent noted in their interview 
that the iconic status of the species only matters to people in developed countries, and 
that the status would probably matter less to people in developing countries.  
However, in the case of bluefin tuna management, the most powerful and influential 
ICCAT delegations that provide the science that supports management decisions and 
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funding for research are all from developed countries, where this status has high 
importance.  ICCAT meetings, management focus, and research are all focused 
squarely on bluefin tuna, at the expense of other species some respondents noted. 
 Three respondents mentioned an interesting anecdote on this topic.  ICCAT 
does not proportionally manage all stocks under its management.  Silky sharks 
(Carcharhinus falciformis) and porbeagle sharks (Lamna nasus), which each have 
very poor stock statuses, do not have an “iconic” or “charismatic” status, and are much 
worse off from a survival standpoint than bluefin tuna (Oceana 2012, ICCAT 2012c). 
Yet these shark species are not a focus of ICCAT at management meetings because 
they are caught as bycatch in non-targeted fisheries. Despite repeated attempts by 
environmental NGOs and conservation groups, they have not been afforded the same 
protections that bluefin tuna have (Oceana 2012).  Respondents went further to note 
that perhaps an “iconic” or “charismatic” status could help to contribute to better 
management of these species by ICCAT, which raises important prioritization issues.
 Interestingly, several respondents suggested that perhaps ICCAT’s 
management focus should be on other non-bluefin tuna species, namely the Atlantic 
swordfish or yellowfin tuna.  While the “iconic” label of bluefin tuna seems to affect 
its management, it remains a very complex and difficult question to gauge how not 
having this label could impact other fisheries.  For example, one informant noted that 
ICCAT has shown an ability to effectively rebuild an overfished, valuable fishery that 
they could use as a model for rebuilding bluefin tuna stocks. The swordfish fishery 
was overfished with overfishing occurring for all three management stocks back in the 
1990s (ICCAT 1994).  Despite lack of an “iconic” or “charismatic” label or pressure 
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for legal protection for swordfish, ICCAT imposed strict catch limits, adopted 
measures to reduce capacity in the fleet, and established an aggressive rebuilding goal 
for these stocks.  All three swordfish stocks were successfully rebuilt by the mid 
2000’s ahead of the rebuilding timeline (ICCAT 2008).  This success story raises the 
question of what impact an “iconic” status would have had on swordfish.  
 A few respondents expressed concern and confusion that yellowfin tuna, with a 
significantly higher biomass and a much lower susceptibility to overfishing than 
bluefin tuna in the Convention Area, are not prioritized by ICCAT for rigorous 
scientifically based management. These stocks should not be ignored, however, in 
light of the large scale, fleet, and high value of the fisheries for them.  Several 
respondents also noted that the so-called “tropical tunas” are not prioritized for 
research by the United States, or any other CPC for that matter. “Grande” and other 
scientific research programs are largely driven by contributions from developed, 
wealthy CPCs that put value on the iconic status of the bluefin tuna.  This species is 
the focus of scientific research while other stocks still may not even have MSY 
estimates or proxies, which are basic parameters necessary to effectively manage their 
stocks based on ICCAT’s stated management goals.   
 It is necessary to continue to study levels of mixing in bluefin tuna stocks, and 
the Grande program should be continued.  However, it seems as though the “iconic” 
status of bluefin tuna may actually have an overall negative impact on management of 
ICCAT’s stocks on the whole, because the bluefin tuna takes up most of the limited 
management capacity, attention, and research and enforcement funding even though 
other stocks have equally poor stock status. While eleven respondents called for more 
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funding to research bluefin tuna to help sustain healthy stocks in the near future, 
perhaps more research on non-bluefin species would spur more equitable allocation of 
management resources and lead to more effective management of ICCAT stocks. 
 
     B.  Outlook for ICCAT-Managed Bluefin Tuna 
 ICCAT continued the recent trend of adopting TACs that are within the 
scientific recommendations of the SCRS to help rebuild the western Atlantic and the 
eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stocks at the November 2012 ICCAT General 
Meeting in Agadir, Morocco: 
 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
 (ICCAT) [has] adopted positive measures that will help conserve the 
 iconic Atlantic bluefin tuna, and advance shark protection in the future 
 (World Fishing and Aquaculture 2012, pg. 1). 
 Based on the 2012 updated stock assessments for bluefin tuna, both the 
western Atlantic and eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stocks are showing signs of 
increasing abundance and recovery, which is good news for the species and managers 
alike.  As six respondents noted, this trend can be extended to the benefit of the 
species and the fishery with a dedicated effort by ICCAT and its CPCs to implement 
and enforce scientifically based TACs.  However, the pressures that contributed to the 
decline of bluefin tuna stocks, namely overfishing, IUU fishing, under-reporting of 
catch, high market value of individual bluefin tuna, and others, remain.  ICCAT still 
has the difficult, but not impossible, task of transparently managing its bluefin fishery.  
     
3.  Recommendations and Future Research 
     A.  Specific Recommendations for ICCAT Management of Bluefin Tuna 
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 Despite recent signs of increasing abundance of bluefin tuna stocks, recovery 
of the species remains uncertain.  Recovery would be very important to the field of 
fisheries management since ICCAT is perhaps the most closely monitored fishery 
management organization in the world, and successful bluefin tuna management could 
restore some faith in international fisheries management. Toward these ends, I provide 
practical recommendations for ICCAT based on this thesis. ICCAT must: 
 1.  Retain much of their present management scheme for bluefin tuna for the 
 foreseeable future. 
 
 2.  Continue funding the Atlantic-wide bluefin “Grande” research program to 
 obtain important life history information to better-manage stocks. 
 
 3.  Work with, and not against, environmental NGOs and conservation groups 
 to draw attention to other managed stocks in need of conservation, such as 
 silky sharks and porbeagle sharks, and focus management attention more 
 equitably across all stocks. 
 
 4.  Work with, and not against, environmental NGOs and conservation groups 
 to shift media spotlight away from bluefin tuna and toward other stocks, so that 
 they may be managed  based on scientific evidence for the benefit of the fishing 
 industry and CPCs. 
 
 ICCAT manages bluefin tuna differently than other stocks for a variety of 
reasons including the peculiar biology, life history, and characteristics of the fishery.  
It should continue to utilize regulations that govern ranching and farming operations, 
reduce and eliminate IUU fishing, and divide up national shares of the TAC based on 
the best available science.  The current provisions for multilateral trade sanctions 
against non-compliant fishing entities, mandatory observer coverage, IUU vessel 
blacklist, record of ranching operations, documentation schemes, and research quota 
set-asides currently in place should be retained to allow for effective management of 
the fishery.  It is critical that ICCAT continue to set scientifically based TACs and 
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prove to the world that they can rebuild bluefin tuna stocks to restore confidence in 
RFMO management of shared resources. However, efforts to reduce IUU fishing and 
to increase understanding of the science undermining the current two-stock 
management framework should be undertaken with more vigor. 
 In this light, it is imperative that ICCAT CPCs continue to fund the “Grande” 
bluefin research program around the Convention Area in order to decipher complex 
life history attributes of bluefin tuna. The appropriateness of both the two-stock 
management framework currently employed by ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna and 
the low- and high-recruitment stock status scenarios presented by the SCRS remain 
hotly debated topics in scientific and ICCAT literature, and must continue to be fueled 
by the best scientific advice possible.  Increased bluefin tuna life history information 
should inform new management frameworks to replace ICCAT’s current 2-stock 
management based on landings data and further information on rates of mixing.  
Scientific evidence seems to suggest that managing bluefin tuna as a single stock is 
more appropriate from a biological perspective, and could allow for easier 
implementation of uniform Recommendations and Resolutions throughout the 
Convention Area.  Alternatives to the two-stock management should be explored. 
 Next, while bluefin tuna get most of the media and management attention over 
other ICCAT stocks, they are not most susceptible to becoming collapsed.  Instead, 
stocks of sharks, billfishes, and other species caught as bycatch in other non-target 
fisheries are much worse off than bluefin, especially silky and porbeagle sharks.  
These are the species that should have the attention of conservation and environmental 
NGOs, both because of their poor stock status and because they are not harvested 
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commercially.  ICCAT can work together with environmental NGOs and conservation 
organizations to draw attention to these species through education campaigns.  
 I do not recommend that ICCAT, scientists, the media, or conservation groups 
ignore bluefin tuna just because their stocks seem to rebounding according to aerial 
and tagging surveys, but rather that these groups should strive to work together to 
prioritize management focus on other stocks in a triage-like fashion in the next five 
years. ICCAT could cooperate with NGOs, academics, and others to learn from the 
rise of bluefin to an “iconic” species, and utilize these lessons learned, momentum and 
techniques to build up public interest and standing of other species with poor stock 
statuses.  This could also help build political will and momentum to more effectively 
manage such stocks.  Then, ICCAT should strive to provide proportional management 
focus and effort to other managed stocks based on three utilitarian criteria: CPC 
involvement, rough employment, fleet size, and scale of the fishery.  Perhaps this 
approach can allow for more balance of management effort. Nor do I recommend 
striving to elevate all species’ statuses to the “iconic” level that bluefin tuna have 
attained.  In fact, a species cannot be considered “iconic” or “charismatic” unless they 
share some specific attributes such as large size, rarity in nature, ability to capture 
public imagination, or other characteristics.  Instead, I suggest that ICCAT and NGOs 
be mindful of the rise of the status of bluefin tuna, and be congnizant of the fact that 
this elevated status does not necessarily help in allowing the species to be managed 
based on the best scientific advice of the SCRS.  This research suggests that there is 
potential of a species’ elevated status to positively affect its management, but at a 
potential cost.  Therefore, ICCAT and other partners should strive to call attention to 
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species in need of conservation but keep their mandate of managing based on the best 
available science in mind as well. 
 Finally, the added media scrutiny, non-scientific information, and political 
jockeying that accompany bluefin tuna discussions at ICCAT meetings do not seem to 
help Commissioners set scientifically-based Recommendations to manage stocks.  
These efforts instead seem to hurt specific sectors of the fishing industry for bluefin 
tuna that are well managed, such as the highly selective artisanal hook-and-line, 
harpoon, or trap fishers. The groups responsible for these sources of information 
should instead focus on truly detrimental fishing practices, such as IUU fishing, that 
have undermined ICCAT’s management for decades (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012c). 
 
    B.  Future Research 
 With additional time and funding for travel, I would present a synopsis of my 
research to a major peer-reviewed scientific journal for publication and to the ICCAT 
SCRS for consideration and review at one of their semi-annual meetings.  In addition, 
I would conduct research on the specific impacts that the “iconic” status of bluefin has 
on its management compared to other ICCAT stocks that do not share that status, such 
as silky sharks.  A comparison of ICCAT’s management of Northern bluefin tuna to 
the management of the Pacific bluefin and the Southern bluefin tuna by other RFMOs 
around the world would hold valuable lessons for fisheries management as well.  
Specifically, I propose a study to explore whether or not all three bluefin species share 
an “iconic” status and the implications of this status on their management.  
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     4.  Conclusion 
 Bluefin tuna are different than other ICCAT managed stocks in many ways as 
a result of a complex interaction of biological, social, political, and economic factors 
that continue to evolve over time.  These factors include, but are not limited to, 
development of increasingly capital and technology-intensive fisheries for bluefin 
tuna, commercialization and industrialization of the fishery, the unique life history of 
the species, and the increasing value of meat for the sushi market.  Not all factors have 
equal bearing or weight on management outcomes, and no one factor fully accounts 
for the management framework in place to manage bluefin tuna fisheries. This thesis 
research dispels common misconceptions that bluefin stocks are overfished and 
overfishing is occurring for them solely due to Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons,” 
or because of the high prices paid for bluefin meat alone.  It is important that the 
common perceptions in the fisheries management, political science, and legal 
literature are accurate and based on factual information.  The literature should be more 
clearly informed on the role of these relevant factors that contribute to management in 
order to inform more logical thinking, decision-making and management of fisheries. 
 The fact that bluefin tuna are the only “iconic” status species managed by 
ICCAT is central to the argument made in this thesis. This status influences the 
management of the species in tangible ways, namely through its role in creation of an 
important policy symbol that can be seen in greater numbers of Recommendations and 
Resolutions, management and media attention, and greater non-scientific inputs to the 
decision-making process of bluefin tuna management. This research suggests that the 
special status has been beneficial to the stock status of the bluefin tuna in the 
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Convention Area, but not necessarily for other ICCAT stocks or ICCAT management 
on the whole. ICCAT tends to focus management attention, intensity, and limited 
resources on bluefin tuna while not prioritizing management of other stocks. This 
understanding is critical in finding solutions to perhaps the most complex fisheries 
management saga of our time: rebuilding stocks of this important and unique species, 
and restoring the management effectiveness of ICCAT as a whole (Magnuson 2001).  
Through broader understanding of the context of the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishery of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, opportunities exist for more 
effective management of this and other ICCAT-managed fisheries in the future.  
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APPENDICES 
    Appendix I.  Copy of Email to Potential Key Informants for Interview Request 
 
Mr./Mrs. ___________, 
 
I am currently a Master's student at the University of Rhode Island working on a thesis 
on the management of Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna.   
 
Would you be willing to share some of your insights with me in a short, confidential 
interview to support my thesis research?  I am especially interested in hearing some of 
the politics involved in the unique management of bluefin tuna. 
 
Thank you very much in advance.  I look forward to speaking with you soon. 
 
Sincerely, 
Patrick Samuel 
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     Appendix II.  Copy of Consent to Participate Form 
“The Management Regime of the International Commission for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT): What Makes Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus) 
Different?” 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH 
 
You have been invited to take part in a research project described below. The 
researcher will explain the project to you in detail. Feel free to ask questions. If you 
have more questions later, I, Patrick Samuel, may be reached at (916) 502-6874 or my 
advisor, Professor Seth Macinko, may be reached at (401) 874-2471 to discuss them 
with you. 
 
Description of the project: 
This research will use data from interviews to allow the researcher to gain a better 
understanding of factors that contribute to ICCAT’s unique management of bluefin 
tuna among other managed species in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. 
 
What will be done: 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be interviewed regarding your 
thoughts as they pertain to ICCAT’s management approaches used for bluefin tuna. 
The interview will last roughly an hour and I will take notes with your permission. 
The only additional involvement that may be asked of you would be a brief follow-up 
at some point after the initial interview for clarification of any information originally 
shared. 
 
Risks or discomfort: 
There is minimal risk in participating in this interview. 
 
Benefits of this study: 
This study can benefit the management of bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean in 
enhancing understanding of the factors that contribute to unique management for one 
species (bluefin tuna) among others. This study may benefit you as a stakeholder in 
bluefin tuna management by allowing you to talk through some of these factors and 
potential implications of these for the resource and the fishing industry.  
 
Confidentiality: 
Your participation and information shared in this study is confidential. None of the 
information will identify you by name. No one else will know if you participated in 
this study and no one else can find out what your answers were. All written records 
will be stored in a locked file cabinet in Patrick Samuel’s office at the Coastal Institute 
Kingston at the University of Rhode Island. Transcripts from interviews will be 
encrypted and stored on the student investigator’s password protected computer. 
Scientific reports and academic presentations of this study will be based on group data 
and will not identify you or any individual as taking part in this project. Data will be 
destroyed three years after the completion of the study. 
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In case there is any injury to the subject: 
This study is not expected to cause any injury. If this study causes you any injury, you 
should write or call the office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College 
Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-
4328. 
 
Decision to quit at any time: 
The decision to take part in this study is voluntary. If you decide to take part in the 
study, you may decline to answer any question. You may also quit at any time. If you 
wish to quit during the interview, please inform the interviewer immediately. If you 
wish to quit at a later time, please inform Professor Seth Macinko at (401) 874-2471 
or Patrick Samuel at (916) 502-6874 of your decision. 
 
Rights and Complaints: 
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your 
complaints with Seth Macinko, Associate Professor of Marine Affairs, at (401) 874-
2471 or macinko@uri.edu, or Patrick Samuel, Master of Marine Affairs student, at 
(916) 502-6874 or pjsamuel@my.uri.edu, anonymously, if you choose. In addition, if 
you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, University 
of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, or by telephoning (401) 874-4328. 
 
Important: 
Although this research is studying the factors that contribute to the unique 
management of Atlantic bluefin tuna, this research is neither for nor against any 
management regime. My research is about the factors that contribute to this unique 
management and the implications it has for the resource and the fishing industry. 
Answer questions based simply on what you know; do not worry about not knowing 
some answers. 
 
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature 
on this form means that you are at least 18 years old, you understand the information, 
and you agree to participate in this study.  
 
Thank you for your voluntary participation. 
 
 
________________________   ________________________ 
Signature of Participant    Signature of Researcher 
 
_________________________   ________________________ 
Typed/printed Name     Typed/printed name 
 
__________________________   _______________________ 
Date       Date 
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     Appendix III.  List of Questions Posed to Interview Respondents 
 
1.  How long have you been involved in bluefin tuna research or management issues? 
2.  What approaches does ICCAT currently use to manage bluefin tuna? 
3.  What factors contributed to adoption of these specific management tools? 
4.  What management tools has ICCAT not tried to use to manage bluefin tuna? 
5.  What are the impacts, if any, of broad media attention and the “iconic” or 
“charismatic” status that bluefin tuna have attained on their management? 
6.  What are the consequences, if any, of this status on the bluefin tuna resource and 
the fishing industry? 
7.  What should ICCAT prioritize in the short-term to ensure stocks of bluefin tuna 
remain healthy? 
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